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DEPORTATION HEARINGS, THE PALMER
RAIDS, AND THE MEANING OF HISTORY
HARLAN GRANT COHEN*
As Americans respond to the events of September 11, 2001, they are being forced to
contemplate their place in American history-past, present, and future. This has
become particularly stark in the fight over secret deportation hearings. Following
September 11, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced that the deportation
hearings of "special interest" aliens would be closed to the public. Applying
Richmond Newspapers's two-pronged logic-and-experience test, the Third and
Sixth Circuits subsequently split over the constitutionality of the blanket closure. At
the heart of their disagreement was the scarce history of deportation hearings and
whether such hearings had been closed in the past. In this Note, Harlan Grant
Cohen argues that the "history" test applied by the two courts has been miscon-
ceived. Drawing upon the history of the Palmer Raids of 1919-1920 and the treat-
ment of Russian and Eastern European immigrants during the first Red Scare,
Cohen argues that in examining the secret deportation question, Americans must
ask themselves not what they have done in the past, but instead what lessons they
should learn from those historical practices. Only with this deeper understanding
of the past will Americans truly be able to understand the difficult policy choices of
the present.
INTRODUCTION
Emphatically condemning the Justice Department's response to
the terrorist acts of the prior year, a group of the country's most
respected lawyers wrote:
Under the guise of a campaign for the suppression of radical activi-
ties the office of the Attorney General acting by its local agents
throughout the country, and giving express instructions from
Washington has committed continual illegal acts. Wholesale arrests
* Law Clerk, The Honorable Wilfred C. Feinberg, United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. J.D., 2003, New York University School of Law; M.A. History, 2000,
Yale University; B.A., 1998, Yale University. I thank Professors Michael Wishnie and
William Nelson for their help and guidance in writing this Note. I also must thank Ming
Hsu Chen, Stephen Yuhan, David John Ball, Larry Lee, Adina Rosenbaum, and the edi-
tors of the New York University Law Review for their help, support, and guidance. This
Note is vastly improved because of their input. Finally, I must thank Shirlee Tevet, without
whose constant support, thoughtful criticism, and intermittent goading this Note could not
have been written.
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both of aliens and citizens have been made without warrant or any
process of law; men and women have been jailed and held
incomunicado [sic] without access of friends or counsel; homes have
been entered without search-warrant and property seized and
removed; other property has been wantonly destroyed; workingmen
and workingwomen suspected of radical views have been shame-
fully abused and maltreated. Agents of the Department of Justice
have been introduced into radical organizations for the purpose of
informing upon their members or inciting them to activities; these
agents have even been instructed from Washington to arrange meet-
ings upon certain dates for the express object of facilitating whole-
sale raids and arrests. In support of these illegal acts, and to create
sentiment in its favor, the Department of Justice has also consti-
tuted itself a propaganda bureau, and has sent to newspapers and
magazines of this country quantities of material designed to excite
public opinion against radicals, all at the expense of the government
and outside the scope of the Attorney General's duties.'
This statement, not written in the wake of September 11, but
rather decades past, in May 1920, by, among others, Roscoe Pound,
Felix Frankfurter, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and Tyrell Williams, strikes
an eerily resonant chord in a United States still coping with life after
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The concerns of these
respected members of the bar, addressing a world reacting to the
threat of worldwide Bolshevism, seem to presage criticism of the cur-
rent Bush administration's response to the threat of terrorism. Should
the words of these men, written almost eighty years ago, give
Americans pause today?
History has become a battleground as Americans grapple to find
meaning in the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the changed
world they now inhabit.2 Immediately after the attacks, many
Americans spoke of Pearl Harbor; 3 in memories of the Japanese
attack they saw not only a similarly shocking attack on American soil,
but also a nostalgic vision of moral certainty, a reminder of a time
I The Nat'l Popular Gov't League, Report Upon the Illegal Practices of the United
States Department of Justice 1-2 (1920).
2 See, e.g., Michiko Kakutani, Struggling to Find Words for a Horror Beyond Words,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 2001, at El.
3 See, e.g., R.W. Apple, Jr., Awaiting the Aftershocks, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 2001, at
Al; Adam Clymer, In the Day's Attacks and Explosions, Official Washington Hears the
Echoes of Earlier Ones, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 2001, at A20; Kevin Dobbs & Terry Woster,
Attack More Cowardly than Pearl Harbor, Veterans Say, Argus Leader (Sioux Falls, S.D.),
Sept. 12, 2001, at 1OA; Like Pearl Harbor, This Attack Will Never Be Forgotten, Houston
Chron., Sept. 12, 2001, at 18A; Diana Penner, Veterans Reminded of Pearl Harbor,
Indianapolis Star, Sept. 12, 2001, at A5; Jacques Steinberg, "Worse Than Pearl Harbor, "
and the Words Ring True, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 2001, at A19; John Wilkens, It's Another
Day of Infamy, Say S.D. Pearl Harbor Vets, San Diego Union-Trib., Sept. 12, 2001, at A10.
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when the United States fought wars to defeat evil. 4 Other Americans
eschewed historical analogy, arguing that the world had never seen
anything like September 11 or the threat of Al Qaeda-style terrorism.
Notably, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has warned
critics of the Bush administration's domestic and international policies
that September 11 has changed the world and that those seeking to
apply the rules and lessons of past wars and past investigations are
living in an irrelevant past. 5
The stakes in this battle for history are not merely rhetorical or
psychological. How we understand our history, and the place of
September 11 within it, has very real policy implications. Our govern-
ment and our society are in the midst of making momentous decisions
about our role in the world and the proper balance between national
security and civil rights. These decisions have and will continue to be
shaped by our view of ourselves, of our values, of our history, and of
our legacy.
The relevance of our history to these decisions was brought into
particular focus in two recent circuit court decisions, Detroit Free
4 See, e.g., Jaymes Song, America, Pushed into War Again, Pauses to Remember Pearl
Harbor, Chattanooga Times/Chattanooga Free Press, Dec. 8, 2001, at A5 ("As we come to
this time, we are at war again, our homeland attacked .... It is time for us to rededicate our
lives to the cause of freedom.") (quoting Adm. Vern Clark, chief of naval operations, at
ceremony for Pearl Harbor survivors); Dan Uhlinger, Veterans Liken Terrorist Attacks to
Pearl Harbor, Hartford Courant, Sept. 12, 2001, at B1 (quoting Dan Fruchter, Pearl
Harbor survivor from Mt. Vernon, N.Y.: "We have people who don't want democracy to
survive and we don't understand that. Other people want to take away the liberties we
have."); George Will, 9/11 Lesson: America Is Not Immune, Chi. Sun-Times, Sept. 8, 2002,
at 35 ("In 1941, a mighty empire-an enemy with a serious if reckless geopolitical
strategy-struck at real sinews of U.S. power. In 2001, a delusional, premodern enemy
lashed out at American symbols-iconic buildings-and instantly magnified American
power by dispelling an American mood-call it end-of-history complacency.").
It should not be surprising that Americans reached for this analogy. In the prior few
years, American popular consciousness imbibed an unending series of books, television
shows, and movies extolling the efforts of those who fought in World War II. Americans
were primed to think of good and evil in historical terms. See generally Stephen E.
Ambrose, Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne From
Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest (1992); Tom Brokaw, The Greatest Generation (1998);
Band of Brothers (HBO television broadcast, Jan. 1, 2001); Pearl Harbor (Disney 2001);
Saving Private Ryan (Dreamworks SKG 1999); The Thin Red Line (Twentieth Century
Fox 1999); Windtalkers (MGM/UA 2002).
5 See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Culture War With B-2's, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 2002, at
A13 (quoting Rumsfeld's suggestion "that any who insist on perfect evidence are back in
the 20th century and still thinking in pre-9/11 terms"). But see Will, supra note 4, at 35,
stating that,
[t]he attack that came here 61 years ago . . . erased forever the belief that
geography ... confers permanent security on America. The attacks last year
erased the comparably soothing belief that the logic of military technology
(deterrence) and the march of modernity (the retreat of primitivism) had
written an end to history, meaning the immunity of great powers to attacks.
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Press v. Ashcroft6 and North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft.7
Considering one of the Justice Department's new tactics in its war on
terrorism, the Sixth and Third Circuits split over the constitutionality
of secret deportation hearings. 8 Following September 11, Attorney
General John Ashcroft targeted immigration as a particular security
concern. Along with the absconder apprehension initiative, 9 volun-
tary interview program,' 0 and special registration requirements,'I the
Department of Justice imposed new restrictions on deportation hear-
ings. Pursuant to a September 21, 2001 directive from Chief
Immigration Judge Michael Creppy (the Creppy Directive), "special
interest"' 2 deportation hearings would be closed to the public,
including family and friends. Notably, "'[t]his restriction on informa-
tion includes confirming or denying whether such a case is on the
docket or scheduled for a hearing." 1 3
This secret hearings policy was quickly challenged by groups of
newspapers in both Michigan and New Jersey. The newspapers
argued that the blanket closure violated the public's First Amendment
right of access, as explicated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Richmond
6 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
7 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 4082, at *1 (May 27,
2003).
8 See generally id.; Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d 681.
9 Under the absconder apprehension initiative, the Department of Justice has ordered
the apprehensior of absconders, or aliens who have overstayed their visas. The initiative
specifically instructs Department of Justice agents to focus their efforts on the approxi-
mately 6000 absconders from nations with an Al Qaeda presence. Susan Sachs, Cost of
Vigilance: This Broken Home, N.Y. Times, June 4, 2002, at A15.
10 The Department of Justice has sought out 5000 Muslims on temporary visas for vol-
untary interviews. The program has been criticized for poisoning relations with the Muslim
community, for intimidating potential interviewees, and for its appearance of racial pro-
filing. See Memo Adds to Suspicions of Immigrants on Interviews, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29,
2001, at B6; Jodi Wilgoren, 200 Muslims Are Sought in Michigan, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12,
2001, at B8.
11 According to one article describing the special registration requirements:
The detentions by the Immigration and Naturalization Service brought an ava-
lanche of protests about the program, which focuses on men and boys from 20
countries, mostly Arab and Muslim. The so-called special registration program
requires all men over 16 from these countries who are temporarily in the
United States to appear before an I.N.S. officer to be interviewed, finger-
printed and photographed.
Immigration officers have arrested hundreds of men in the last week after they
appeared voluntarily to register, with an unknown number still in custody
today.
John M. Broder, U.S. Starts Freeing Foreigners Detained in Antiterror Sweep, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 20, 2002, at A24.
12 See infra note 55 and accompanying text for analysis of the precise meaning of this
term.
13 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 684 (quoting Sept. 21, 2001 directive from Chief
Immigration Judge Michael Creppy (the Creppy Directive)).
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Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia14 and its progeny. Applying the
Richmond Newspapers two-part logic-and-experience test, the news-
papers argued that deportation hearings historically had been open to
the public and that openness plays a significant role in the process of
deportation determinations. Further, they argued that the blanket
closure was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest, as required by the Richmond Newspapers line of cases.
In applying the Richmond Newspapers test, both circuits were
forced to consider the history of deportation hearings, its import, and
its meaning. Struggling with the relative scarcity of evidence-the
first general immigration act was enacted only in 1882-the two cir-
cuits came to starkly different conclusions. Whereas the Sixth Circuit
noted the continuing legislative presumption that deportation hear-
ings would remain open, 15 the Third Circuit noted that anecdotal evi-
dence implied that deportation hearings had, at times, been closed. 16
This Note is about the meaning and use of history. In this Note, I
look carefully at the "experience," or "history" prong of the
Richmond Newspapers test and its applicability to deportation hear-
ings.17 I argue that the example of deportation hearings demonstrates
that the prong has been either misconceived or misapplied; the test
cannot be merely, "Is there a history of open proceedings?" For the
test to have any meaning, I argue it must include not only "What is the
history?" but also, "What are the lessons of that history?" 18 Further, I
14 448 U.S. 555, 575-80 (1980) (holding rights of free speech and press, which prevent
government from excluding public from criminal trials, are guarantees that existed long
before adoption of First Amendment).
15 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701-02.
16 N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
2003 U.S. LEXIS 4082, at *1 (May 27, 2003).
17 I will not comment at length here on the Third and Sixth Circuit Courts' application
of the "logic" prong or their strict scrutiny analysis. A full Note could be written on either
topic. Although my discussion will not provide a'full and complete answer to the question
presented to the courts, I believe that discussion of the history prong will aid an under-
standing of the case as a whole, coloring the view of the entire Richmond Newspapers test.
Of course, even accepting my view of the history prong, a court could still find that a
compelling government interest in fighting terrorism demands such restrictions and that
secret deportation hearings are narrowly tailored to those ends.
18 This is particularly true in the deportation context. Criminal trials are a visible part
of our everyday lives; as the Court notes in Richmond Newspapers, "a tradition of accessi-
bility implies the favorable judgment of experience." 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in judgment). In contrast, immigration cases, as the scarcity of evidence indicates,
tend to remain hidden except in times of national crisis. If the question is merely "What is
the history?" we are likely to obtain a skewed sample. This crisis bias can only be reme-
died by looking at the lessons learned after the crisis-the historical judgment of the
restrictions enacted. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944), holding that the
internment of Japanese Americans during World War II was constitutional, presents a
good analogy. While technically still good law, the decision has been universally reviled; it
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contend that this formulation is dictated by both the logic of the
Supreme Court's earlier decisions and by a closer look at the history
of American immigration policy. Taking a cue from the government's
briefs in Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media Group, I look at
the context surrounding one of the cited "exceptions" to open depor-
tation hearings-the deportation of Russian and Eastern European
men in the 1920s. 19
On May 1, 1919, Americans awoke to news of a "'nation-wide
bomb conspiracy. ' ' 20 Thirty-six small bombs had been mailed to
prominent American citizens, from Alabama to San Francisco.21 The
conspiracy was quickly associated with the newly apparent threat of
international communism, and Russian and Eastern European immi-
grants immediately became suspect. Responding to heightening
public fear of the Communist threat, a threat eventually remembered
as the "Red Scare," then-Attorney General Mitchell Palmer led a
year-long effort to arrest and deport alien "radicals," the so-called
Palmer Raids.2 2 Although the history of the Palmer Raids and the
Red Scare of 1919 and 1920 does not definitively answer the question
asked by the two circuit courts-whether deportation hearings have
been historically open to the public-it can enlighten our under-
standing of the role history should play in determining both the consti-
tutionality of secret deportation hearings, specifically, and the
balancing of national security and civil rights, more generally. The
lesson of the Palmer Raids is that the history of American immigra-
tion policy is often written in times of national emergency. It is a his-
tory not written with "the favorable judgment of experience, '23 but
instead out of panic and fear. Al Qaeda is not the first international
terrorist movement to threaten American institutions and strike fear
would be specious to argue that history shows that such a restriction is acceptable. See
infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
19 See Brief for Appellants at 39-40 n.8, N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d
198 (3d Cir. 2002) (No. 02-2524) [hereinafter Government Brief] (citing Jane Perry Clark,
Deportation of Aliens from the United States to Europe 9 (1931)). Technically, Clark's
book describes deportation procedures in the mid-1920s, not the period of the Palmer
Raids that occurred in 1919 and 1920. However, Clark herself implicitly recognizes that
the policies of 1925 had been and continued to be shaped by the events of 1919-1920. See
Clark, supra, at 9.
20 Edwin P. Hoyt, The Palmer Raids, 1919-1920: An Attempt to Suppress Dissent 6
(1969) (quoting 36 Were Marked as Victims by Bomb Conspirators, N.Y. Times, May 1,
1919, at Al).
21 Id.
22 See generally id.; Charles H. McCormick, Seeing Reds: Federal Surveillance of
Radicals in the Pittsburgh Mill District, 1917-1921 (1997); Robert K. Murray, Red Scare:
A Study in National Hysteria, 1919-1920 (1955).
23 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
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in Americans; John Ashcroft is not the first Attorney General to make
immigrants the focus of his war on terrorism.
This Note proceeds in two parts. Part I lays out the split between
the Third and Sixth Circuits. Part L.A explores the limited First
Amendment right of access to certain types of government proceed-
ings that was first explicated in Richmond Newspapers and subse-
quently developed into a two-part test by the Supreme Court in Globe
Newspaper,2 4 Press-Enterprise 1,25 and Press-Enterprise H.26 Part I.B
describes the Creppy Directive and current Department of Justice
policy. It also examines the diverging circuit opinions in Detroit Free
Press and North Jersey Media Group.
Part II looks more closely at the meaning of the "history" prong
of the Richmond Newspapers test. Part II.A revives the history of an
earlier attempt to balance national security and civil rights: the first
Red Scare and the Palmer Raids.27 Part II.B ponders the meaning of
the Richmond Newspapers history prong in light of the Palmer Raids.
Wrestling with the purpose of history and the language of the Court's
opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Part II.B looks to a richer, fuller
use of history and its lessons than that currently used by the courts.
The revised history prong that emerges from this analysis revivifies
the values articulated in Richmond Newspapers and deepens the
inquiry into the proper balance between civil rights and national
security in a time of crisis. While a deeper understanding of history
does not tell our generation what balance to strike, it can help to put
these decisions into historical context and to focus our views on the
values at stake.
I
THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS
A. Richmond Newspapers and Its Progeny
The Supreme Court first identified a limited First Amendment
right of access to certain governmental proceedings in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.28 At the beginning of the third retrial of
a murder suspect, a Virginia trial judge granted the defense attorney's
motion to close the trial to the public. The prosecutor did not
object.29 Two reporters for Richmond Newspapers, however, did
24 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
25 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
26 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
27 For more on how this discussion of the Palmer Raids builds on the literature, see
infra note 101 and accompanying text.
28 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575-80.
29 Id. at 560.
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object, and after the Virginia Supreme Court rejected their appeal, the
two reporters sought U.S. Supreme Court review.30
Although a strong majority of the Court-seven of the eight sit-
ting justices3 1-agreed that the trial court judge's order was unconsti-
tutional, the six separate concurring opinions demonstrate their
difficulty in articulating reasons or a test.32 Nevertheless, looking at
both the long, "unbroken, uncontradicted history" 33 of public criminal
trials in Anglo-American law and the purposes of the First Amend-
ment,34 the six concurring opinions agreed that "the right to attend
criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment;
without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised
for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and 'of the press
could be eviscerated." 35
30 Id. at 562-63.
31 Justice Powell did not take part in the case. Id. at 558.
32 Richmond Newspapers was decided against the backdrop of two other cases, Gannett
Co., v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), and Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
In Gannett, the Court declined to find a Sixth Amendment public right of access to crim-
inal proceedings. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 391. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment
right to a public criminal trial was only a right of the accused, not of the public. Id. at 387.
In Houchins, the Court held that the First Amendment "press clause" did not grant the
media "a constitutional right of access to a county jail, over and above that of other per-
sons, to interview inmates and make sound recordings, films, and photographs for publica-
tion and broadcasting by newspapers, radio, and television." Houchins, 438 U.S. at 3.
33 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
34 Chief Justice Burger stated:
In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First
Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so
as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees. "[T]he First Amendment goes
beyond protection of the press and self-expression of individuals to prohibit
government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the
public may draw."
Id. at 575 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)). Justice
Brennan's concurrence, which has gained importance in subsequent cases, see infra notes
38-43 and accompanying text, contains the most extensive discussion of the First
Amendment's structural role:
But the First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free expres-
sion and communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a structural role
to play in securing and fostering our republican system of self-government.
Implicit in this structural role is not only "the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," but also the antecedent
assumption that valuable public debate-as well as other civic behavior-must
be informed. The structural model links the First Amendment to that process
of communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails solici-
tude not only for communication itself, but also for the indispensable condi-
tions of meaningful communication.
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587-88 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (citations
omitted).
35 Id. at 580 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 681 (1972) (citations omitted)); see also Justice Stevens's concurrence: "Today,
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The Supreme Court quickly affirmed, clarified, and expanded this
holding in a series of subsequent cases. In Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, the Court considered the constitutionality of a
Massachusetts law requiring "trial judges, at trials for specified sexual
offenses involving a victim under the age of 18, to exclude the press
and general public from the courtroom during the testimony of that
victim." '36 Justice Brennan, writing for the Globe Court, held the
Massachusetts law unconstitutional, reaffirming the Richmond News-
papers opinion.37 More importantly, building on his prior concur-
rence in Richmond Newspapers, Justice Brennan laid out a rationale
for the First Amendment right as well as a test for determining when
it would apply. Holding that the right of access inhered in a structural
understanding of the First Amendment's role-an understanding of
the Amendment's role in the Constitution as a whole-Justice
Brennan wrote:
Underlying the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is
the common understanding that "a major purpose of that Amend-
ment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."
By offering such protection, the First Amendment serves to ensure
that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and con-
tribute to our republican system of self-government. Thus to the
extent that the First Amendment embraces a right of access to crim-
inal trials, it is to ensure that this constitutionally protected "discus-
sion of governmental affairs" is an informed one. 38
This rationale, based on the First Amendment protection of informed
discussion of governmental affairs, helped shape the test that
followed.
however, for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary interference
with access to important information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the
press protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Despite the confused result, Richmond Newspapers was, in the words of Justice
Stevens, "a watershed case." Id. at 582. As Justice Stevens noted, "Until today the Court
has accorded virtually absolute protection to the dissemination of information or ideas, but
never before has it squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to
any constitutional protection whatsoever." Id. at 582. One commentator has noted, "[T]he
central premise of Richmond Newspapers is that meaningful self-government requires an
informed electorate, and that where the representative government itself maintains control
of information essential to such an informed public discourse, the government may be
affirmatively required to provide that information to the public." Eugene Cerruti,
"Dancing in the Courthouse": The First Amendment Right of Access Opens a New
Round, 29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 237, 239 (1995).
36 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 598 (1982).
37 Id. at 603 ("The Court's recent decision in Richmond Newspapers firmly estab-
lished . . . that the press and general public have a constitutional right of access ....
[Sleven Justices recognized that this right of access is embodied in the First Amendment,
and applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.").
38 Id. at 604-05 (citations omitted).
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Justice Brennan explained that the public, open nature of crim-
inal trials rested on two features of the criminal justice system: history
and logic. 39 First, Justice Brennan noted that "the criminal trial his-
torically has been open to the press and general public.... This uni-
form rule of openness has been viewed as significant in constitutional
terms not only 'because the Constitution carries the gloss of history,'
but also because 'a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable
judgment of experience.' ,,40
Second, he stated:
[T]he right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant
role in the functioning of the judicial process and the government as
a whole. Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and
safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, with benefits to
both the defendant and to society as a whole. Moreover, public
access to the criminal trial fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby
heightening public respect for the judicial process. And in the
broadest terms, public access to criminal trials permits the public to
participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process-an
essential component in our structure of self-government. 41
This exposition became the core of the two-part logic-and-experience
test now used to determine whether various governmental proceed-
ings must be presumptively open. 42
Finally, Justice Brennan held for the Court that once it has been
determined that the public does have a constitutional right of access to
a particular governmental proceeding, closure of that proceeding to
the public must be "necessitated by a compelling governmental
interest[ ] and .. narrowly tailored to serve that interest. '43
39 Id. at 606 ("In sum, the institutional value of the open criminal trial is recognized in
both logic and experience.").
40 Id. at 605 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589). Importantly, Justice
Brennan rejected the State's argument that at least some portions of rape trials had been
historically closed. Justice Brennan asserted that for the purposes of finding a First
Amendment right of access, the relevant sample was criminal trials, not some subset
thereof. If a particular type of criminal trial requires closing, it is only because the state
has a compelling interest that can override the First Amendment right.
In Richmond Newspapers, the Court discerned a First Amendment right of access to
criminal trials based in part on the recognition that, as a general matter, criminal trials have
been long presumptively open. Whether the First Amendment right of access to criminal
trials can be restricted in the context of any particular criminal trial, such as a murder trial
(the setting for the dispute in Richmond Newspapers) or a rape trial, depends not on the
historical openness of that type of criminal trial, but rather on the state interests allegedly
supporting the restriction. Id. at 605.
41 Id. at 606.
42 For applications of the test, see infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
43 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607.
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Any doubt as to the scope of this finding was eliminated in the
Court's subsequent decisions in Press-Enterprise 144 and Press-
Enterprise //.45 In applying the logic-and-experience test to these
cases, the Court held that the public had a right of access to voir dire
examination and preliminary hearings. Notably, the Court made it
clear that a history of openness dating to the Norman conquest (the
case for criminal trials) was unnecessary. In Press-Enterprise II, the
Court based its decision on exclusively post-Bill of Rights history.46
These decisions were quickly followed by a series of circuit court
decisions extending the right of access to bills of particulars,47 pretrial
suppression hearings,48 pretrial motions for venue change,49 bail
reduction hearings, 50 post-trial examinations of jurors, 51 and civil
trials. 52 Yet in other cases, the circuit courts have applied the
Richmond Newspapers test to find that no public right of access
applied. 53
44 Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
45 Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
46 See id. at 10-12 (discussing history of preliminary hearings from trial of Aaron Burr
to modern day). Notably, the Court may also have been rejecting the notion that the
history had to be strictly "unbroken" and "uncontradicted." In his dissent, Justice Stevens
noted evidence before the Court that preliminary hearings were not always open histori-
cally. Id. at 21-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47 See United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1985).
48 See In re Application of The Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1984).
49 See In re Charlotte Observer, 882 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1989).
50 See United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1983).
51 See generally United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994).
52 Notably, despite Justice O'Connor's reluctance in her Globe Newspapers concur-
rence to extend the right of access beyond criminal trials, 457 U.S. at 611 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring), every court that has considered extending it to civil trials has done so. See,
e.g., Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 252-54 (4th Cir. 1988);
Westmoreland v. CBS, 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733
F.2d 1059, 1066-71 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Cont'l I11. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308-16 (7th
Cir. 1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1176-81 (6th Cir.
1983); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 800-02 (11th Cir. 1983). These developments
were presaged by Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers:
"Whether the public has a right to attend trials in civil cases is a question not raised by this
case, but we note that historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively
open." Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
53 See, e.g., United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 815-16 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding
no right of access to university student disciplinary board proceeding); Capital Cities
Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1166-76 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding no right of access to
files and records of state environmental agency); First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial
Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 481 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding no right of access to judi-
cial disciplinary board hearings). Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of West Whiteland,
193 F.3d 177, 183-84 (3d Cir. 1999), is more complicated. In that case, applying the
Richmond Newspapers test, the Third Circuit found no right of access to videotape a Town-
ship Planning Commission meeting. The court did, however, indicate that there was a
constitutional right of access to attend the planning meeting. This holding appears to have
been narrowed by the Third Circuit in its decision in North Jersey Media Group, where the
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B. The First Amendment Public Right of Access to
Deportation Hearings
1. The Creppy Directive
On September 21, 2001, just ten days after the terrorist attacks,
Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy issued new instructions to
all immigration judges. 54 The Creppy Directive, as the instruction
came to be known, ordered immigration judges to close all hearings
designated by the Department of Justice as "special interest" hear-
ings.55 Pursuant to the Directive, deportation hearings of "special
interest" aliens are closed to the public, including family and friends.
Immigration judges are to avoid discussing the cases with anyone
outside the immigration courts; in fact, "the restriction even 'includes
confirming or denying whether such a case is on the docket or sched-
court announced that "[a]s the Planning Commission never actually denied Whiteland
Woods the access guaranteed by state law, however, our broad statement was dicta and we
do not follow it here." N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 214 (3d Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 4082, at *1 (May 27, 2003).
54 Deportation hearings are administrative hearings in front of administrative law
judges; they are not criminal trials. Immigration judges operate under the authority of the
Department of Justice. As the Third Circuit explained:
The Immigration and Nationality Act charges the Attorney General with the
"administration and enforcement" of "all [ ] laws relating to the immigration
and naturalization of aliens." The Act authorizes the Attorney General to
remove aliens from the United States for various reasons, including violation
of the immigration laws. It also permits him to prescribe "such regulations...
as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority," and provides for
removal proceedings to be conducted by immigration judges within the Execu-
tive Branch "under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General."
Id. at 202 n.1 (citations omitted) (alteration in original). The Creppy Directive was issued
under this authority.
55 There appears to be some dispute as to the exact delimitations of the "special
interest" category. See Government Brief, supra note 19, at 6. The government asserts
that "[t]hese cases involve aliens who 'might have connections with, or possess information
pertaining to, terrorist activity against the United States."' Id. (citation omitted). The
government presents as an example "'aliens who had close associations with the
September 11 hijackers or who themselves have associated with al Qaeda or related ter-
rorist groups."' Id. (citation omitted). Further, the government asserts that '[a]s the
investigation has progressed, special interest designations have been reevaluated and in
many cases removed; thus, '[i]t is only those INS detainees about whom concerns remain
who are included in the "special interest" category."' Id. (citation omitted). However, the
Sixth Circuit noted:
[N]o definable standards used to determine whether a case is of "special
interest" have been articulated. Nothing in the Creppy Directive counsels that
it is limited to "a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals." In fact,
the Government so much as argues that certain non-citizens known to have no
links to terrorism will be designated "special interest" cases. Supposedly,
closing a more targeted class would allow terrorists to draw inferences from
which hearings are open and which are closed.
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 692-93 (6th Cir. 2002).
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uled for a hearing."' 56 "In short, the Directive contemplates a com-
plete information blackout along both substantive and procedural
dimensions. ' 57 Rather than decide closure motions on a case-by-case
basis, as had been done up to that point, immigration judges now must
implement a blanket closure.
The Creppy Directive was quickly challenged by members of the
press who had been barred from such hearings and denied informa-
tion. In both the Third and Sixth Circuits, the government defended
the blanket closures, arguing that there is no First Amendment right
of access to administrative hearings, that the government has broad
plenary power over immigration, and that the demands of national
security warrant such restrictions. The government further argued
that a terrorist group in possession of the names of those being inves-
tigated would be able to interfere in the investigations, change ter-
rorist plans, or intimidate witnesses. In particular, the government
laid out a "mosaic theory" that they believed made a case-by-case
analysis of closure (allowed under relevant immigration regulations
and Richmond Newspapers) impossible. The mosaic theory posits
that various pieces of information, seemingly innocuous in and of
themselves, when put together like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle can give
an enterprising terrorist group important information as to the shape
of government investigations. Thus, the identities of those subject to
deportation hearings might give a terrorist group information about
the government's investigatory techniques and the progress of their
investigations. Even the absence of information, contends the govern-
ment, might be of use to a terrorist organization; it could use the
absence of various names on the deportation docket as evidence that
certain terrorist agents are still at large, or worse, that the government
does not know about them. 58
56 N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 202-03 (quoting the Creppy Directive); see also
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 683-84; Government Brief, supra note 19, at 1-2.
57 N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 203.
58 In describing the mosaic theory, the Sixth Circuit stated:
Bits and pieces of information that may appear innocuous in isolation, but
used by terrorist groups to help form a "bigger picture" of the Government's
terrorism investigation, would be disclosed. The Government describes this
type of intelligence gathering as akin to the construction of a mosaic, where an
individual piece of information is not of obvious importance until pieced
together with other pieces of information. . . . The identifications of the
detainees, witnesses, and investigative sources would be disclosed. Terrorist
groups could subject these individuals or their families to intimidation or harm
and discourage them from cooperating with the Government. Methods of
entry to the country, communicating, or funding could be revealed. This infor-
mation could allow terrorist organizations to alter their patterns of activity to
find the most effective means of evading detection. Information that is not
presented at the hearings also might provide important clues to terrorist [sic],
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Arguing the unconstitutionality of the Creppy Directive's blanket
closure, the newspapers asserted that the public enjoys a First
Amendment right of access to deportation hearings. The newspapers
argued that the Richmond Newspapers two-part test applies to depor-
tation hearings, that deportation hearings have historically been open
to the public, and that openness has played and continues to play an
important safeguard role in ensuring the fairness of those hearings.
They contend that openness is particularly important in the immigra-
tion context: Given the government's broad powers and the immi-
grant's fewer constitutional rights than American citizens enjoy,
public scrutiny is the only safeguard against government abuse of
power.59 Lastly, the newspapers argued that the Creppy Directive
failed the "strict scrutiny" test required under Richmond Newspapers;
the blanket closure rule simply is not tailored narrowly enough to jus-
tify abridging the public's First Amendment rights. Case-by-case eval-
uation of secrecy concerns, in camera if necessary, can protect both
the public's civil rights and national security.
Considering almost identical cases, district courts in New Jersey
and Michigan held in favor of the newspapers. According to both
courts, the public enjoyed a First Amendment right of access to depor-
tation hearings, so blanket closure was not narrowly tailored to the
government's national security concerns; the Creppy Directive was
thus unconstitutional. 60
because it could reveal what the investigation has not yet discovered. The
Government provides this example: If the government discloses the evidence
it has about a particular member of a terrorist organization, but fails to men-
tion that the detainee is involved in an impending attack, the other members of
the organization may be able to infer that the government is not yet aware of
the attack.
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 706-07 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 47-49 (internal quo-
tations and citations omitted)).
59 As the Sixth Circuit noted in Detroit Free Press:
While the Bill of Rights zealously protects citizens from such laws, it has never
protected non-citizens facing deportation in the same way. In our democracy,
based on checks and balances, neither the Bill of Rights nor the judiciary can
second-guess government's choices. The only safeguard on this extraordinary
governmental power is the public, deputizing the press as the guardians of
their liberty.
Id. at 683.
60 See generally N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 304 (D.N.J.
2002); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 948 (E.D. Mich. 2002). The
newspapers also asked the courts to enjoin the government from closing hearings under
the Creppy Directive. The Eastern District of Michigan granted an injunction covering the
Sixth Circuit; the District of New Jersey granted a nationwide injunction. See N. Jersey
Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 305-06; Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 948. The
U.S. Supreme Court eventually granted the government a stay of the nationwide injunction
pending appeal. Ashcroft v. N. Jersey Media Group, 536 U.S. 954 (2002).
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2. The Sixth Circuit Opinion in Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft
Judge Keith, writing forcefully for the Sixth Circuit, upheld the
decision of the Eastern District of Michigan finding the Creppy
Directive unconstitutional.
Today, the Executive Branch seeks to take this safeguard away from
the public by placing its actions beyond public scrutiny. Against
non-citizens, it seeks the power to secretly deport a class if it unilat-
erally calls them "special interest" cases. The Executive Branch
seeks to uproot people's lives, outside the public eye, and behind a
closed door. Democracies die behind closed doors. The First
Amendment, through a free press, protects the people's right to
know that their government acts fairly, lawfully, and accurately in
deportation proceedings. When government begins closing doors, it
selectively controls information rightfully belonging to the people.
Selective information is misinformation. The Framers of the First
Amendment "did not trust any government to separate the true
from the false for us." They protected the people against secret
government. 61
First, Judge Keith affirmed that the Richmond Newspapers test is
a test of general applicability, and thus, the correct means for deter-
mining whether deportation hearings must be presumptively open. 62
He rejected the government's assertion that Richmond Newspapers
did not apply to administrative hearings generally, or deportation
hearings specifically. 63
61 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 683 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 773
(1972)).
62 Id. at 694.
63 A great deal could be written on the scope of the Richmond Newspapers test. Both
the Third and Sixth Circuits agreed that that test was one of general applicability and cited
extensive case law from the circuit courts to that effect. Also, as the Sixth Circuit notes,
the recent Supreme Court decision in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State
Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743 (2002), seems to cut against the government's contention that
administrative hearings generally should be immune. In that case,
the Court held that state sovereign immunity bars an administrative agency
from adjudicating complaints filed by a private party against a non-consenting
state because it concluded that such administrative proceedings bore a striking
resemblance to civil litigation. The Court reached this conclusion although it
assumed that the proceedings before the Federal Maritime Commission were
not "judicial proceedings." Nevertheless, the Court noted that the parties did
not dispute the appellate court's characterization that the Federal Maritime
Commission proceedings "walked, talked, and squawked very much like ...
lawsuits."
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 697 (quoting Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 751).
The circuit court's judgment appears to be in line with the prevailing wisdom, and I
will not go into the question in depth here. However, it is worth noting that there are at
least practical arguments against applying Richmond Newspapers to administrative hear-
ings. The strongest is that if Congress knew that any legislative presumption of openness
might lead the court to find a right of access, Congress would be encouraged to make
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Second, he rejected the government's argument that their plenary
powers over immigration shielded them from a presumption of open-
ness and from judicial review.64 Applying the two-part test, Judge
Keith found that "deportation proceedings historically have been
open.' '65 First, he rejected the government's argument that the history
of formal immigration hearings, dating only from 1882, is insufficiently
lengthy to pass the Richmond Newspaper test. Press-Enterprises II,
looking only at post-constitutional history, eliminated any possibility
that only a history dating to the Norman Conquest could be sufficient.
Instead, looking at the statutes and regulations that have governed
immigration hearings since 1882, Judge Keith found that deportation
hearings had consistently enjoyed a legislative presumption of open-
ness. He noted that in each statute, Congress specifically closed only
exclusion hearings; Congress has never legislated the closing of depor-
tation hearings. This distinction was not accidental: "Congress has
long been aware that deportees are constitutionally guaranteed
greater procedural rights than those excluded upon initial entry.
secrecy and closure the rule of thumb in agency-empowering statutes. See N. Jersey Media
Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 216 (3d Cir. 2002) ("Were we to adopt the
Newspapers' view that we can recognize a First Amendment right based solely on the logic
prong if there is no history of closure, we would effectively compel the Executive to close
its proceedings to the public ab initio or risk creating a constitutional right of access that
would preclude it from closing them in the future.").
64 In summary, the court points out that although the government does possess consid-
erable power with regard to substantive immigration law-i.e., who can come in, who can
stay-they do not possess the same broad power with regard to immigration procedures.
A long line of cases has recognized that government action in this area is limited by consti-
tutional protections such as the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d
at 687-88 ("The Supreme Court has always interpreted the Constitution meaningfully to
limit non-substantive immigration laws, without granting the Government special defer-
ence."); see also Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 309 (1970) ("We extend to
such an alien the same constitutional protections of due process that we accord citizens.");
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) ("It is true that aliens
who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after pro-
ceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of
law."); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) ("It is well established that if
an alien is a lawful permanent resident of the United States and remains physically present
there, he is a person within the protection of the Fifth Amendment. He may not be
deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process of law."). Judge Keith goes
into a lengthy discussion of the difference between deportation and exclusion hearings and
the status of aliens already in the country as "persons" under the Bill of Rights. Detroit
Free Press, 303 F.3d at 688-93. It is not clear, however, why this discussion is necessary, as
the right in question-the First Amendment right of access-inheres in the public, and not
the alien subject to deportation. The discussion may nonetheless buttress Keith's view that
openness plays an important role in deportation hearings that it may not in exclusion hear-
ings. Notably, the Third Circuit does not address the plenary powers over immigration at
all, seemingly assuming that it is limited by the Constitution. See generally N. Jersey Media
Group, 308 F.3d 198.
65 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701.
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Therefore, Congress likely legislated key differences between both
procedures accordingly. '66 Further, "[s]ince 1965, INS regulations
have explicitly required deportation proceedings to be presumptively
open," 67 and Congress appears to have approved of these regulations.
"Since that time, Congress has revised the Immigration and
Nationality Act at least 53 times without indicating that the INS had
judged their intent incorrectly. "68
Moreover, Judge Keith rejected the government's contention
that, notwithstanding the legislative presumption, deportation hear-
ings had in practice been closed. The government pointed to "a single
passage in a study about deportation of noncitizens to Europe during
the 1920s and a single Second Circuit case, for the proposition that
deportation hearings took place in a variety of settings, including
prisons, hospitals, and homes. '69 Judge Keith found this evidence
unpersuasive. First, there was no reason to believe that such hearings
were anything other than exceptional. Second, "neither of these
sources even hint that the public could not attend a hearing at a
prison, hospital, or home. Certainly, one could imagine family and
friends being present at some of these places." Third, "the study cited
by the Government points out that members of Congress, like Plain-
tiff Conyers, sometimes attended, or sent representatives to, such
hearings. '70 Judge Keith concluded:
At best, the Government's claimed "historical proof" shows only
that in some cases, there may not be much historical record. This
does not mean, however, that there was not a historical practice of
one kind or the other. In such cases, it makes more sense to look to
more recent practice, similar proceedings, and concentrate on the
"logic" portion of the test.71
Deportation hearings also passed the logic test. Judge Keith con-
cluded that "[p]ublic access undoubtedly enhances the quality of
deportation proceedings. ' 72 First, openness plays an important role in
protecting against government abuse. "In an area such as immigra-
66 Id. at 702.
67 Id. at 701.
68 Id. (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Immigration
and Naturalization Legislation from the Statistical Yearbook, available at http:/I
www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/legishist/index.htm (last modified May 28,
2002).
69 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 703 (referring to government reliance on Clark, supra
note 19, at 363, and United States ex rel. Ciccerelli v. Curran, 12 F.2d 394, 396 (2d Cir.
1926) (finding that deportation hearings may be held in prison)).
70 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 703 (citing Clark, supra note 19, at 368 n.14). Plaintiff
Conyers is Representative John Conyers, Jr., congressman from Michigan).
71 Id. at 703 n.14.
72 Id. at 703.
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tion, where the government has nearly unlimited authority, the press
and the public serve as perhaps the only check on abusive government
practices. '73 "Second, openness ensures that government does its job
properly; that it does not make mistakes. ' 74 Third, open hearings
have therapeutic value for a wounded community: "[A]fter the devas-
tation of September 11 and the massive investigation that followed,
the cathartic effect of open deportations cannot be overstated. They
serve a 'therapeutic' purpose as outlets for 'community concern, hos-
tility, and emotions."' 75 "Fourth, openness enhances the perception
of integrity and fairness. '76 Finally, "public access helps ensure that
'the individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to
our republican system of self-government.' 77
Finding a right of access to deportation hearings, Judge Keith
next determined that the blanket closure rule could not pass strict
scrutiny analysis. Although Judge Keith recognized that "[t]he
Government certainly has a compelling interest in preventing ter-
rorism, ' 78 he found that case-by-case determination of the secrecy
requirements of each individual case should suffice. He found the
government's argument that harmful information would be released
in making the determination unpersuasive. 79
[T]here seems to be no limit to the Government's argument. The
Government could use its "mosaic intelligence" argument as a justi-
fication to close any public hearing completely and categorically,
including criminal proceedings. The Government could operate in
virtual secrecy in all matters dealing, even remotely, with "national
security," resulting in a wholesale suspension of First Amendment
rights. By the simple assertion of "national security," the
73 Id. at 704.
74 Id.
75 Id. (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980)).
76 Id. ("The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials
can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that
anyone is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and
that deviations will become known." (quoting Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. 501, 508
(1984))).
77 Judge Keith added:
"[A] major purpose of [the First Amendment] was to protect the free discus-
sion of governmental affairs." Public access to deportation proceedings helps
inform the public of the affairs of the government. Direct knowledge of how
their government is operating enhances the public's ability to affirm or protest
government's efforts. When government selectively chooses what information
it allows the public to see, it can become a powerful tool for deception.
Id. (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604).
78 Id. at 706.
79 To the extent that "special interest" aliens were allowed to inform anyone they
wanted of their impending hearing, Judge Keith found the government's position illogical.
Id. at 708.
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Government seeks a process where it may, without review, desig-
nate certain classes of cases as "special interest cases" and, behind
closed doors, adjudicate the merits of these cases to deprive non-
citizens of their fundamental liberty interests.80
3. The Third Circuit Opinion in North Jersey Media Group v.
Ashcroft
Judge Edward R. Becker, writing for the Third Circuit in North
Jersey Media Group, agreed with the Sixth Circuit that the Richmond
Newspapers test was applicable to deportation hearings. 81 Neverthe-
less, he found neither a history of open deportation hearings nor the
requisite positive role for openness. Determining that special interest
deportation hearings82 do not pass the two-part test and are thus not
subject to a constitutional right of access, Judge Becker found the
Creppy Directive constitutional; no strict scrutiny analysis was
necessary.8 3
Looking at the same historical evidence presented by the parties
in Detroit Free Press, Judge Becker found that "the tradition of open
deportation hearings is too recent and inconsistent to support a First
Amendment right of access."'84 The court found the legislative pre-
sumption unpersuasive, particularly in light of the evidence presented
by the government that "from the early 1900s, the government has
often conducted deportation hearings in prisons, hospitals, or private
80 Id. at 709-10.
81 N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2002) ("In this
one respect we note our agreement with the Sixth Circuit's conclusion in their nearly iden-
tical case.").
82 The Third Circuit seems to be confused as to exactly what set or subset of cases it is
analyzing. The court looks at the history of deportation hearings generally. See id. at 209-
11. Speaking explicitly of deportation hearings generally, the court seems to apply the
logic test to special interest hearings in particular. See id. at 216-18. Then, in summing up
its conclusions, the court limits its finding to special interest hearings:
We do not decide that there is no right to attend administrative proceedings, or
even that there is no right to attend any immigration proceeding. Our judg-
ment is confined to the extremely narrow class of deportation cases that are
determined by the Attorney General to present significant national security
concerns. In recognition of his experience (and our lack of experience) in this
field, we will defer to his judgment.
Id. at 220. The confusion seems to flow from a flaw in the court's application of the logic
prong noted in Judge Anthony J. Scirica's dissent. Id. at 224-25 (Scirica, J., dissenting). As
will be discussed, infra note 93, the Court's application of the logic test to the subset of
special interest deportation hearings runs counter to Justice Brennan's Globe Newspaper
opinion. There, Justice Brennan specifically declined to look at the subset of rape trials,
emphasizing that the relevant analysis was all criminal trials. See Globe Newspaper, 457
U.S. at 605 n.13.
83 See N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 221.
84 Id. at 211.
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homes, places where there is no general right of public access."'8 5 The
court recognized that those hearings might still have been open to the
public, but it placed the burden on the newspapers to prove that they
were.86 The court also noted that various particular types of deporta-
tions have been statutorily closed, for example, those involving abused
alien children and spouses.87 Further, working hard to distinguish its
own case law, and seemingly vitiating the need for a history of open-
ness at common law,88 the court seemed to revive the requirement for
a "1000-year tradition of public access." 89 In sum, "[d]eportation pro-
ceedings' history of openness is quite limited, and their presumption
of openness quite weak. They plainly do not present the type of
'unbroken, uncontradicted history' that Richmond Newspapers and its
progeny require to establish a First Amendment right of access." 90
Nor did Judge Becker find the logic prong satisfied. 91 Judge
Becker did agree with the Sixth Circuit that openness for deportations
would serve a variety of salutary functions, including:
[1] promotion of informed discussion of governmental affairs by
providing the public with the more complete understanding of the
judicial system; [2] promotion of the public perception of fairness
which can be achieved only by permitting full public view of the
proceedings; [3] providing a significant community therapeutic
value as an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion; [4]
serving as a check on corrupt practices by exposing the judicial pro-
cess to public scrutiny; [5] enhancement of the performance of all
involved; and [6] discouragement of perjury.92
85 Id. at 212.
86 Id. at 212 n.ll.
87 Id. at 212.
88 In United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 554 (3d Cir. 1982), the court found a right of
access to pretrial hearings even though no right existed at common law. Judge Edward R.
Becker distinguished that case as decided before Press-Enterprise II and as specifically
limited to criminal trials. In United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 838 (3d Cir. 1994), the
court found a right although no history predated 1980. Judge Becker distinguished that
case by characterizing it as specifically criminal (and thus tangentially supported by the
long history cited in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)) and by
differentiating between no history (which might be ignored) and unclear history (which
cannot be ignored). Finally, Judge Becker distinguished the court's opinion in Whiteland
Woods, L.P. v. Township of West Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding "tra-
dition of accessibility" for local planning board meetings by founding its opinion in guar-
antee of statute (citing Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986))). See N. Jersey Media
Group, 308 F.3d at 21.3-14.
89 N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 220 (internal quotations omitted).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 216 ("Even if we could find a right of access under the Richmond Newspapers
logic prong, absent a strong showing of openness under the experience prong, a proposi-
tion we do not embrace, we would find no such right here.").
92 Id. at 217 (quoting Simone, 14 F.3d at 839).
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However, Judge Becker argued that in determining whether
openness would play a positive role, the court must consider detri-
mental as well as beneficial effects. The government cited ways in
which enterprising terrorists might use unconcealed deportation infor-
mation to endanger the country. 93 Balanced against the benefits of
openness, Judge Becker found the argument that openness plays an
overall positive role unpersuasive. 94 Echoing the tone of the entire
decision, Judge Becker concluded:
We are keenly aware of the dangers presented by deference to the
executive branch when constitutional liberties are at stake, espe-
cially in times of national crisis, when those liberties are likely in
greatest jeopardy. On balance, however, we are unable to conclude
that openness plays a positive role in special interest deportation
hearings at a time when our nation is faced with threats of such
profound and unknown dimension.95
II
FINDING MEANING IN HISTORY
Although arriving at vastly different conclusions, both the Third
and Sixth Circuits struggled with the scarcity of historical evidence
regarding deportation hearings. Rather than the deep, long, anec-
93 As Judge Scirica explains in his vigorous and persuasive dissent, this inclusion of the
government's arguments for secrecy in these "special interest" cases is simply wrong. Id. at
225 (Scirica, J., dissenting). The court appears to be considering the subset of special
interest deportation hearings rather than the larger set of deportation hearings generally.
The Richmond Newspapers test, however, applies to the larger group, here, deportation
cases. Once a First Amendment right of access is found to inhere in those proceedings, the
government could show that compelling interests require presumptive closure of a smaller
subset, here, special interest deportation cases. Justice Brennan makes this very clear in
Globe Newspaper:
In Richmond Newspapers, the Court discerned a First Amendment right of
access to criminal trials based in part on the recognition that as a general
matter criminal trials have long been presumptively open. Whether the First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials can be restricted in the context of
any particular criminal trial, such as a murder trial (the setting for the dispute
in Richmond Newspapers) or a rape trial, depends not on the historical open-
ness of that type of criminal trial but rather on the state interests assertedly
supporting the restriction.
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 n.13 (1982).
94 Judge Becker stated:
In this case, the Government presented substantial evidence that open depor-
tation hearings would threaten national security. Although the District Court
discussed these concerns as part of its strict scrutiny analysis, they are equally
applicable to the question whether openness, on balance, serves a positive role
in removal hearings. We find that upon factoring them into the logic equation,
it is doubtful that openness promotes the public good in this context.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 217.
95 Id. at 220.
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dotal history of open criminal proceedings stretching back through the
centuries, the courts were faced with small shards of immigration's
past legislative presumptions and elliptical references in forgotten
books and cases. The actual practice of deportation hearings since
1882 seems to have been left largely unrecorded, lost to history. Con-
fronted with so little information, it is perhaps not surprising that the
courts came to such different conclusions. But were the courts
looking in the right place?
Among the small pieces of evidence presented to the courts was a
passage in a 1931 book describing the deportation of European aliens
during the 1920s.96 In trying to demonstrate that deportation hearings
had been closed in the past, the government seized upon a passage
noting that deportation hearings could be held in "a county jail, hos-
pital, or prison or at [the deportee's] own home. '97 The government
contended that these places are generally not open to the public and
that it could thus be presumed that these hearings had been closed.
This is a controversial claim: As the Sixth Circuit pointed out, this
neither proved that they had been closed, nor that they were anything
other than exceptional. 98 But looking closer at the book cited, the
first few passage.s present a deeper question. The book begins:
"Periods of war hysteria and economic depression generate a fear of
sudden ruin and a desire for panaceas. In the decade from 1920 to
1930 a nostrum often advocated for the ills of the United States was
the removal of aliens from the country." 99 Is this really "the favorable
judgment of experience"'100 sought in Richmond Newspapers?
The systematic targeting of immigrants during the Palmer Raids
and the Red Scare of 1919-1920 pose this question starkly.10 1 The
96 See generally Clark, supra note 19.
97 See Government Brief, supra note 19, at 40 n.8 (citing Clark, supra note 19, at 363).
98 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 703 n.14 (6th Cir. 2002).
99 Clark, supra note 19, at 9.
100 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J., con-
curring in judgment).
101 Surprisingly little has been written on the Palmer Raids. Although the Raids are
often mentioned in American history textbooks, there are very few full-length scholarly
discussions. Among the few exceptions are Hoyt, supra note 20; McCormick, supra note
22; Murray, supra note 22; Louis F. Post, The Deportations Delirium of Nineteen-Twenty:
A Personal History of an Historic Official Experience 96-133 (1923). Those that are avail-
able are difficult to find.
This trend is amplified in the legal literature, in which the Raids are frequently men-
tioned to describe the excesses of the government in previous decades, but are never
explained or described in full. The legal literature simply refers to the Raids as symbolic of
past mistakes without any discussion of how or why we can or should learn from them.
See, e.g., William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security
Surveillance, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 24-25 (2000) (making glancing, disfavorable reference to
Palmer Raids); Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political
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history of the Palmer Raids does not answer the question of whether
deportation hearings were or were not presumptively open, but this
well-recorded, deeply condemned history of government abuse seems
nonetheless relevant. 10 2 Can a test so concerned with history ignore
history's judgments of disfavor?
A. The Palmer Raids and the Red Scare of 1919-1920
1. Background
On or around May 1, 1919 (May Day), The New York Times
announced the existence of a "nationwide bomb conspiracy, which the
police authorities sa[id] ha[d] every earmark of International Workers
of the World-Bolshevik origin.' 0 3 The story revealed that thirty-six
small bombs'0 4 had been mailed to prominent American citizens
living from Georgia to San Francisco.' 0 5 May Day was an interna-
tional labor holiday, and Americans were readying themselves for a
Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1139,
1166 n.98 (same); Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act,
and Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and
Noncitizens, 28 St. Mary's L.J. 833, 835, 846-50 (1997) (same). I hope that this Note helps
to alleviate rather than exacerbate that problem.
102 See Murray, supra note 22, at ix. Its relevance was well stated by one author:
Nonetheless, to American history the Great Red Scare remains important-
important because it provides us with a concrete example of what happens to a
democratic nation and its people when faith and reason are supplanted with
fear. Moreover, it demonstrates clearly how easily the seeds of excessive hate
and intolerance, which for the most part have remained dormant in modern
American society, can suddenly develop into dangerous malignancies that
spread with lightning rapidity through the whole social system.
Id.
103 Hoyt, supra note 20, at 6 (quoting 36 Were Marked as Victims by Bomb Conspira-
tors, supra note 20, at Al) (describing International Workers of the World-Bolshevik
origin as "left-wing radical origin"). Another newspaper announced that "'Reds Planned
May Day Murders."' Murray, supra note 22, at 71 (quoting Reds Planned May Day
Murders, Chi. Trib., May 1, 1919, at 1).
104 Although thirty-six is the number most commonly cited, the exact number seems to
be in controversy. McCormick writes of thirty bombs, see McCormick, supra note 22, at
98, and Murray writes that "[tihe numbers vary slightly, the total given by the Justice
Department being only twenty-nine," Murray, supra note 22, at 71 n.6; see also Attorney
General A. Mitchell Palmer on Charges Made Against Department of Justice by Louis F.
Post and Others, Hearing Before the House Comm. on Rules, 66th Cong. 157 (1920) [here-
inafter Palmer Statement I] (statement of A. Mitchell Palmer, Attorney General). Among
those targeted were the Postmaster General (charged with interdicting seditious materials),
the Secretary of Labor, the Commissioner General of Immigration, four U.S. senators, the
mayors of New York and Seattle, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, John D.
Rockefeller, J.P. Morgan, and Attorney General Palmer himself. See Palmer Statement I,
supra, at 157-58.
105 Hoyt, supra note 20, at 6; McCormick, supra note 22, at 98; Murray, supra note 22, at
70-71.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. School of Law
HeinOnline  -- 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1453 2003
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
day of rallies, protests, marches, and riots.10 6 It was obvious from the
list of those targeted "and from the timing of the mailings that who-
ever had sent the bombs hoped to rid the nation .. of government
officials and important industrialists suspected of being intensely
antiradical."' 10 7 On June 2, nine bombs exploded at the homes of
various prominent citizens and a Philadelphia church.108 Con-
gressmen, public officials, and the general press all "clamored for
immediate punitive action."' 09 Rushing to react, government officials
and ordinary people launched a nationwide assault on left-wing
groups that would later be titled the "Red Scare."'110
The bomb scare was not seen as an isolated incident. To many
Americans, the bombs were merely proof that their fears of
Bolshevism, radicalism, and left-wing revolution were well founded.
Bolsheviks had seized power in Russia in 1917, apparently demon-
strating the dangerous revolutionary power of a handful (11,060) of
Communists;"' "[t]he Bolshevik notion spread ... like wildfire."" 2
As Bolshevik Parties threatened to take control in Germany,
106 Murray, supra note 22, at 73-76. Riots broke out at many May Day events that year,
including events in Boston, New York, and Cleveland. Id.; see also Palmer Statement I,
supra note 104, at 157 ("There was serious rioting, particularly in New York, Boston, and
Cleveland.").
107 Murray, supra note 22, at 71.
108 See Palmer Statement I, supra note 104, at 158-59. Palmer was again among those
targeted. Id.
109 See Murray, supra note 22, at 72. Assistant Secretary of Labor Louis F. Post
described the press's treatment of the bombings as "the newspaper drive that was made to
create a great terroristic scare in the country." Investigation of Administration of Louis F.
Post, Assistant Secretary of Labor, In the Matter of Deportation of Aliens, Hearing on
H.R. 522 Before the House Comm. on Rules, 66th Cong. 70 (1920) [hereinafter Post
Investigation] (statement of Louis F. Post, Assistant Secretary of Labor).
110 Palmer described his mandate as follows:
A year ago, or thereabouts, when the country was ringing with reports of
actual violence directed against officials of the Government in many parts of
the country, and on every hand appeared the unmistakable evidence of serious
plottings against our peace and safety by enemies of the Government, the
public demand for prompt counteraction on the part of the Government was
reflected in the action of the Congress in making generous appropriation to the
Department of Justice to support the thorough reorganization of our Bureau-
of Investigation, which was then inaugurated, and to proceed, with all the dili-
gence and thoroughness to cope with the apparent evil.
Palmer Statement I, supra note 104, at 7.
111 Hoyt, supra note 20, at 14-15.
112 Palmer Statement I, supra note 104, at 14-15, 17; see also id. at 15-16 ("[A] small
group of determined men, knowing exactly what they wanted and driving ruthlessly for it
without hesitation or scruple .... wield[ed] the whole engine of power, . . crush[ed] every
obstacle of resistance, and ... w[o]n the most singular victory of minority dictatorship the
world has ever witnessed.").
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Hungary, and other parts of Europe, 113 Americans became aware of
the threats of radicalism at home. This "radical" danger, first demon-
strated by the assassination of President William McKinley by
anarchist Leon Czolgosz in 1901, took on new relevance in 1919 as a
series of violent events took place across the country. On January 15,
forty-six members of the International Workers of the World (the
I.W.W. or "Wobblies"), a radical labor organization, were connected
with the bombing of the home of the Governor of California. On
February 12, the Secret Service arrested Pietro Pierre, who was "iden-
tified as the leader of an anarchist plot to assassinate President
Wilson." 114 Even before the May bomb scare, government leaders
and officials were reporting "that I.W.W.'s, anarchists, radical social-
ists, and Bolshevists in the United States were trying to overthrow the
government in bloody revolution" and were calling for a halt to all
immigration into the United States. 115
American society and politics in 1919 were highly volatile,
waiting for a spark to set things off.116 World War I had ended with an
armistice in November of 1918, and the United States quickly found
itself caught in the chaos of demobilization.1 7 Discharged soldiers
began pouring back into the country. 118 Wartime price controls were
canceled by the government, causing rapid inflation.Y' 9 Most notably,
labor unions, which had stayed quiet during the war, began to reassert
themselves. 120 In January of 1919, New York harbor workers and
dressmakers went on strike. In February, a general strike was called
in Seattle 121 and a national packinghouse strike "was narrowly
averted. 1 2  In March, New Jersey rail workers struck as well.' 23 In
the months following the bombings, New York cigar workers, Boston
113 See Murray, supra note 22, at 43 ("Germany was being rent with Spartacist revolts,
Poland was badly infected with the Bolshevik virus, and both Hungary and Bavaria tempo-
rarily established soviet-type regimes."); see also Palmer Statement I, supra note 104, at 17-
18 (detailing apparent spread of communism to Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey,
Poland, Austria, Serbia, Holland, France, Portugal, Italy, China, Korea, Japan, India,
Canada, and others).
114 Hoyt, supra note 20, at 15.
115 Id. at 15-16 (internal quotations omitted).
116 See Murray, supra note 22, at 57 ("As we have seen, however, conditions were any-
thing but normal in 1919.").
117 See id. at 5-9.
118 Hoyt, supra note 20, at 8; Murray, supra note 22, at 6.
119 Hoyt, supra note 20, at 10; Murray, supra note 22, at 7.
120 Murray, supra note 22, at 8-9 ("Great industrial unrest resulted. Major strikes, which
had been relatively few, now became prevalent.").
121 See id. at 58-66 for a more detailed account of the Seattle strike and its connection
with Bolshevism in the popular imagination.
122 Hoyt, supra note 20, at 10-11.
123 Id. at 11.
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policemen, national railroad and subway workers, and most notably,
the United Mine Workers, would all strike. 124 Many of the strikes
were accompanied by violence.
The May bomb scare focused American attention on radicals,
immigrants, and labor unrest, all of which became inexorably inter-
twined in the public's imagination of left-wing revolution and ter-
rorism.125 Labor Secretary William B. Wilson told a group of
businessmen that the rash of strikes was the work of Bolsheviks
seeking to spur revolution. 126 Cleveland's mayor proposed deporting
all foreigners who failed to become Americans as soon as they pos-
sibly could. The New York Times "devoted a full half front page of
one of its major Sunday sections to translations of various Bolshevist
papers," and ran an article under the headline: "Russian Reds are
Busy Here: Workers Union has 500 Agents Spreading Bolshevism in
the United States. '12 7 On June 13, New York state authorities raided
the official New York office of the Russian Bolshevik Mission to the
United States.' 2 8 And as President Wilson toured the country to
advocate membership in the League of Nations, he warned audiences
of "the dangers of revolution in the United States.' ' 29
Responsibility for quashing the "radical" threat was thrust upon,
and seized by, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer.1 30 One of
Palmer's first acts was the creation of the General Intelligence
124 Id. at 41.
125 Murray, supra note 22, at 16.
[T]he assumption that the country was under serious attack by the Reds found
wide acceptance. In the long run, each social and industrial disturbance was
received as prima-facie evidence of the successful spread of radicalism. Even
the temporary instability arising from demobilization and reconversion, and
the many justified protests concerning high prices, were traced to the Reds.
Id. Further,
by late 1919, a radical was anyone suspected of being pro-German, a Russian
or other foreigner, a person who sent bombs through the mails, a believer in
free love, a member of the I.W.W., a Socialist, a Bolshevist, an anarchist, a
member of a labor union, a supporter of the closed shop, or anyone who did
not particularly agree with you.
Id. at 167. Palmer himself connected all of these elements in his testimony before
Congress. Among the elements he cited were the steel and coal strikes of 1919, the rail-
road strike of 1920, investigations of the Union of Russian Workers, El Ariete Society,
Communist Party of America, Communist Labor Party, the I.W.W., and "the negro agita-
tion." See Palmer Statement I, supra note 104, at 155.
126 Hoyt, supra note 20, at 39.
127 Id. at 35-36.
128 Id. at 37.
129 Id. at 42.
130 In October of 1919, the U.S. Senate voted unanimously in favor of a resolution
calling on Attorney General Palmer to inform the Senate what actions he was taking
against the radicals. Id. at 48. Others have noted, however, that Palmer was also a fron-
trunner for the Democratic presidential nomination and may have seen such action as a
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Division of the Department of Justice, tasked with collecting informa-
tion about various radical groups and assisting the Bureau of Investi-
gation (BI).13 1 Palmer had a number of legal instruments at his
disposal-the wartime Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of
1918 were still in effect. But given that a large percentage of the
"radicals" in the United States were foreign-born and often not natu-
ralized, immigration laws became the most potent weapon in Palmer's
arsenal. Under the Alien Control Act of 1918, any foreigners who
believed in the violent overthrow of the U.S. government were
excluded from entering the country.132 Palmer used the 1918 Act to
arrest suspected radicals and to have them deported from the country.
2. The Palmer Raids
Egged on by a fearful public, Palmer launched an all-out assault
on foreign "radicals. ' 133 During nationwide raids in November 1919
and January 1920, Justice Department agents were specifically
instructed to look for noncitizens:
If a person claims American citizenship, he must produce documen-
tary evidence of the same. If native-born, through birth records. If
naturalized, through producing for agent copy of naturalization
papers. Be sure that these papers are final papers, containing words
"and is hereby admitted to become a citizen of the United States."
... Only aliens should be arrested; if American citizens are taken by
mistake, their cases should be immediately referred to the local
authorities.134
political opportunity. See Murray, supra note 22, at 192; see also supra note 110 and
accompanying text.
131 Hoyt, supra note 20, at 39-40.
132 According to section 1 of the Act: "[A]liens who are members of or affiliated with
any organization that entertains a belief in, teaches, or advocates the overthrow by force or
violence of the government of the United States shall be excluded from admission into the
United States." Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17, 21 (D. Mass. 1920), rev'd sub nom. Skef-
fington v. Katzeff, 277 F. 129 (1st Cir. 1922) (citing Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 4289 1/
4b[1]). "Section 2 provide[d] for the deportation of such aliens, irrespective of the time of
their entry." Id. (citing Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 4289 1/4b[2]).
On December 19, 1919, the U.S. House of Representatives actually approved an
amendment to the Alien Control Act, which would have further excluded "any group
which did not believe in organized government, and any group that would seek overthrow
of the government or sabotage of government or even advocate unlawful destruction of
property." Hoyt, supra note 20, at 76.
133 See Palmer Statement I, supra note 104, at 166 ("The results of the investigations
conducted by the Bureau of Investigation of radical activities showed that the predomi-
nating cause of the radical agitation in the United States was the alien population in this
country."); id. at 26 ("Most of the individuals involved in this movement are aliens or
foreign-born citizens.").
134 Colyer, 265 F. at 37-38 n.2.
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The main target of the raids and arrests were Russians and
Eastern Europeans. 135 This captured the general fear of Bolshevism
and the free association of Bolshevism with Russians. This targeting
also captured the widely held belief that it was recent Eastern Euro-
pean immigrants who were behind the labor unrest. 136 Among the
initial targets were the Union of Russian Workers, the Russian Mis-
sion in New York, and the Russian People's House.137 Anecdotal evi-
dence demonstrates that those undertaking the raids believed that it
was specifically Russians they were looking for.138 Later raids
included the Lithuanian Socialist Choir and assaults on other sus-
pected communist meeting places. 139
Palmer used every legal mechanism at his disposal to help find
and arrest these alleged foreign radicals. The Justice Department
adopted a BI rule stating that mere membership in various groups-
such as the Union of Russian Workers, the Communist Party, and the
Communist Labor Party-was enough to qualify for deportation
under the Alien Control Act.' 40 A Justice Department agent could
thus look to group membership rolls to identify candidates for arrest
and deportation. 141 Palmer was also successful in amending the Immi-
gration Bureau rules concerning when aliens would have access to
counsel.1 42 Prior to the first set of raids in November 1919,
135 McCormick notes that the majority of those deported aboard the Buford in
December 1919 were alleged members of the Union of Russian Workers. See McCormick,
supra note 22, at 164.
136 McCormick notes that various local officials took advantage of the situation and
sought to use the raids as a means to break organized labor. One Bureau of Investigations
(BI) agent leading raids in the mining regions of Pennsylvania appears to have "belat-
edly . realized that mine owners had used the BI to settle a score against an unruly
community of foreigners." Id. at 154. Further, at least one memo "shows that government
officials understood deportation primarily as a device to tame rebellious industrial
workers-native and immigrant-not an emergency measure to save the country from
revolution." Id. at 150-51.
137 See id. at 153-55 (recounting raids at Russian boarding houses with predominantly
Russian populations and rumors that Russians planned to march on Washington).
138 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
139 See McCormick, supra note 22, at 167-87 (describing broad-based assault on
Communists toward end of Red Scare).
140 See id. at 155. "For your confidential information, the Bureau has to state that the
Department holds the Communist Party of America to be an organization mere member-
ship in which brings an alien within the purview of the Act of October 16, 1918." Colyer v.
Skeffington, 265 F. 17, 33 (D. Mass 1920), rev'd sub nom. Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 F. 129
(1st Cir. 1922) (quoting letter from A. Caminetti, Commissioner General of Immigration,
to Commissioner of Immigration at Boston).
141 The instructions given to agents bear this out. See, e.g., Colyer, 265 F. at 37 n.2.
("Upon taking person into custody try to obtain all documentary evidence possible to
establish membership in the Communist Party, including membership cards, books, papers,
correspondence, etc.").
142 See McCormick, supra note 22, at 158.
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Immigration Bureau Rule 22, subdivision 5(b), read, "At the begin-
ning of the hearing under the warrant of arrest the alien shall be
allowed to inspect the warrant of arrest and all the evidence on which
it was issued, and shall be apprised that he may be represented by
counsel. 1 43 Thus, many of those arrested after the first set of raids
secured counsel, refused to talk about their views, and had to be
released for lack of evidence. Prior to a second set of raids in January
1920, however, the Bureau modified the rule to read:
Preferably at the beginning of the hearing under the warrant of
arrest or at any rate as soon as such hearing has proceeded suffi-
ciently in the development of the facts to protect the Government's
interests, the alien shall be allowed to inspect the warrant of arrest
and all the evidence on which it was issued and shall be apprised
that thereafter he may be represented by counsel.144
The practical result of this changed rule was to cut the alien off
from any representation by counsel until the inspector, cooperating
with or advised by the agent of the Department of Justice, was of the
opinion that the "hearing had proceeded sufficiently in the develop-
ment of the facts to protect the government's interests."'1 45
Even with the vast powers given to authorities under existing
laws, various new laws were proposed to extend government authority
even further. Palmer proposed a new sedition law that would provide
for automatic deportation of aliens who belonged to "[R]ed" organi-
zations.146 Further, the law would denaturalize and deport any natu-
ralized citizen convicted of "[R]ed" activity. 147 The proposed law
defined sedition extraordinarily broadly, including:
to oppose, prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the
United States, or the free performance by the United States govern-
ment, or any one of its officers, agents, or employees of its or his
public duty, commits or attempts, or threatens to commit any act of
force against any person or any property, or any act of terrorism,
hate, revenge, or injury against the person or property of any
officer, agent or employee of the United States .... 148
143 Colyer, 265 F. at 46.
144 Id.
145 See id.
146 Hoyt, supra note 20, at 65.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 66.
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The House of Representatives considered a similarly harsh bill,
the Graham Bill,' 49 which would have imposed the death penalty for
insurrection or the aid of insurrection.15 0
On November 7, 1919, the second anniversary of the Russian
Revolution, Palmer took action. Targeting the Union of Russian
Workers, Justice Department agents, with the help of local authorities,
raided meeting places in eleven cities, arresting 250 people.151 The
raid of the Union of Russian Worker headquarters in New York was
particularly massive and violent. Knocking doors off their hinges and
swinging clubs and nightsticks, the raiders stormed the building.
Those found there, including a group then learning English, were
lined up against the wall.152 "[Two hundred] men and women were
violently assisted out of the building by a special riot squad and driven
away to Justice Department headquarters . . . for questioning." 153
According to The New York Times, some of those arrested had been
"'badly beaten by the police ... their heads wrapped in bandages
testifying to the rough manner in which they had been handled." 154
After questioning, only thirty-five of those arrested in New York that
night were held. State and local officials followed with their own
raids. On November 8, 700 New York City police officers raided sev-
enty-three radical centers, arresting 500 people.155 This pattern
repeated itself elsewhere in the country.
On December 21, 1919, 249 of the arrested "radicals" were
loaded onto a ship, the Buford, and deported. 156 The general press
lauded the deportations, expressing hope that the Buford would be
quickly followed by more "Soviet Arks."'1 57 Starting on January 2,
1920, Palmer launched a second set of raids, this time aimed at the
149 Id. at 98, 130 (citing Graham Bill, To punish offenses against the existence of the
Government of the United States, and for other purposes, H.R. 11430, 66th Cong. § 2
(1920)).
150 Id. at 98-100.
151 See Hoyt, supra note 20, at 52-53; Murray, supra note 22, at 196-97. Palmer
explained that he targeted the Union of Russian Workers "because their organization and
its tenets, its purposes, its plans, its beliefs, brought them within the language of the depor-
tation statute." Charges of Illegal Practices of the Department of Justice: Hearings Before
a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 66th Cong. 8 (1921) [hereinafter
Palmer Statement II] (statement of A. Mitchell Palmer, Attorney General).
152 See Hoyt, supra note 20, at 87.
153 Murray, supra note 22, at 197.
154 Id. (quoting 200 Caught in New York, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1919, at Al).
155 See id.; Hoyt, supra note 20, at 57-58. Palmer sets the number at 247. Palmer State-
ment I, supra note 104, at 28.
156 See Hoyt, supra note 20, at 77-78; Murray, supra note 22, at 207.
157 Murray, supra note 22, at 207-09; see also Hoyt, supra note 20, at 79; cf. Scores of
Pakistanis Are Deported by U.S., N.Y. Times, July 10, 2002, at A10 (noting mass deporta-
tion of 131 Pakistanis picked up in post-September 11 dragnets on single chartered flight).
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Communist and Communist Labor Parties. More than 4000 active
and passive party members in thirty-three cities were arrested as
authorities "entered bowling alleys, pool halls, cafes, club rooms, and
even homes, and seized everyone in sight." 158 Men were "taken out of
their beds at 3 o'clock in the morning in their homes."'1 59 "[D]azzled"
by the nationwide raids, the public hailed Palmer as "the savior of the
nation. "160
The crisis had reached its peak, and fear of the Red menace
began to wane.' 6' By May 1920, just a year after its start, the crisis
was over. The Justice Department had predicted that the radicals
would undertake massive operations on May 1, 1920 in order to spark
a full-scale uprising against the U.S. government.162 May 1 came and
went without event. The failure of the Department's warnings-com-
bined with mounting criticism of the raids, of Palmer, and of his tech-
niques-began to change the mood of the country and fear of radical
revolution waned. 163 As the feeling of fear subsided, it nonetheless
left an indelible mark on the country. "Civil liberties were left pros-
trate, the labor movement was badly mauled, the position of capital
greatly enhanced, and complete antipathy towards reform was
enthroned." 164
3. Condemning the Raids
The criticism of Palmer and his tactics that emerged from the year
of fear was deep and scathing. In May 1920, the National Popular
Government League published a sixty-seven-page report condemning
the Palmer Raids.1 65 The report, signed by leading scholars and
158 Murray, supra note 22, at 213; see also Palmer Statement II, supra note 151, at 8.
All the worst features of the November raids reoccurred, but on a much larger
scale. There was the knock on the door, the rush of the police. In meeting
houses, all were lined up to be searched; those who resisted often suffered
brutal treatment. Except for a few who carried documentary proof of citizen-
ship[,] all were taken to police headquarters for intensive questioning; usually
they received a confession to sign, and often were threatened or beaten if they
refused to comply. Prisoners were put in overcrowded jails or detention cen-
ters where they remained, frequently under the most abominable conditions,
until called for deportation.
Hoyt, supra note 20, at 87 (quoting Stanley Coben, A. Mitchell Palmer: Politician 110
(1963)).
159 Post Investigation, supra note 109, at 71 (statement of Louis F. Post, Assistant
Secretary of Labor).
160 Murray, supra note 22, at 217.
161 See id. at 239.
162 See Hoyt, supra note 20, at 108.
163 See id. at 111-19.
164 Murray, supra note 22, at 17.
165 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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lawyers, as well as Francis Cane, who had resigned from the
Department of Justice in protest over the Palmer Raids, concluded:
American institutions have not in fact been protected by the
Attorney General's ruthless suppression. On the contrary, those
institutions have been seriously undermined and revolutionary
unrest vastly intensified. No organization of radicals acting through
propaganda over the last six months could have created as much
revolutionary sentiment in America as has been created by the
Department of Justice itself.166
The publication of the report roughly coincided with the Con-
gressional testimony of Assistant Secretary of Labor Louis Post.
Although Palmer had taken control of the raids, it was the Depart-
ment of Labor that had actual authority over immigration. As Acting
Secretary of Labor,167 Post had final authority over deportation
cases.168 As he investigated the cases of those who had been arrested,
he found that "[v]ery few, if any, ...were the kind of aliens that
Congress could in reasonable probability have intended to compre-
hend in its anti-alien legislation." 169 Reviewing the cases, Post eventu-
ally cancelled 2202 of the warrants, upholding only 556.170
A still-fearful public was aghast at Acting Secretary Post's
apparent sympathy for the Reds. 71 As Congress considered his
impeachment, Post was forced to testify and defend his actions. 172 His
testimony proved to be a turning point. Post told Congress about the
Justice Department's wide-scale abuse of power and about warrant-
less searches and arrests. Moreover, the criteria used by the Depart-
ment of Justice to determine whom to deport simply was irrational:
"[I]t is almost impossible to believe that the men knew they were
doing anything but going to school or going to a social club of men
from their own country and of their own speech. 1 73 In particular,
Post noted that "[w]ith all these sweeping raids all over the country,"
agents found only three pistols-hardly evidence of plans for a radical
166 Hoyt, supra note 20, at 116-17.
167 Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson was ill at the time. See id. at 107.
168 Murray, supra note 22, at 210, 247.
169 Id. at 248 (citing Post Investigation, supra note 109, at 79, 209).
170 See Murray, supra note 22, at 251; see also Hoyt, supra note 20, at 105.
171 See Murray, supra note 22, at 248.
172 See Post Investigation, supra note 109, at 6 (statement of Rep. Homer Hoch of
Kansas) (noting that "if the charges are found to be true, [they] call[ ] for an impeachment
resolution"). At the outset, Palmer himself told Congress that Acting Secretary Post had
always been sympathetic to Post's own impeachment and Palmer cited Post's "stubborn
incapacity." Palmer Statement I, supra note 104, at 20.
173 Post Investigation, supra note 109, at 71 (statement of Louis F. Post, Assistant
Secretary of Labor).
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revolution. 174 He also noted that only forty to fifty of the thousands
arrested had actually admitted favoring the overthrow of the U.S.
government.1 75
These concerns were echoed in a June 23, 1920 decision by
District Court Judge George W. Anderson. In Colyer v. Skeffington,
Judge Anderson held that the decision to treat all Communist Party
and Communist Labor Party members as radicals was misguided and
overbroad. He wrote, "These two organizations [the Communist and
Communist Labor Parties], proscribed by the Department of Justice,
[were] the result of a factional split or row in the summer of 1919 in
the old Socialist Party.'1 76 Judge Anderson found that most of the
alleged radicals had little idea what the new organizations stood for.
"Social, educational purposes, and race sympathy, rather than political
agitation, constituted the controlling motives with a large share of
them. They joined the local Russian or Polish or Lithuanian Socialist
or Communist Club, just as citizens join neighborhood clubs, social or
religious, or civic, or fraternal. 1' 77 As historians have noted, many of
the people on the membership rolls did not even realize that they
were on them. After the Bolshevik Revolution, many smaller groups
of similar stripes affiliated with the Communist Party; the Communist




175 Id. at 71-72.
176 Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17, 50 (D. Mass 1920), rev'd sub nom. Skeffington v.
Katzeff, 277 F. 129 (1st Cir. 1922). Judge Anderson continued:
The result was that the rank and file of the less educated membership knew
little or nothing about the controversy, or the nature and extent of the change,
if any, in the Program and principles of the party. Some of them regarded it
simply as a change of name; others knew there was some sort of little under-
stood change in Program and purpose. But the great mass of the former
Socialists who had thus become alleged Communists had no real comprehen-
sion of any important or material change either in their associations or in the
political or economic purposes sought to be achieved by their negligibly weak
organizations.
Id. Notably, Judge Anderson's decision was submitted into the Congressional record in its
entirety. See Palmer Statement II, supra note 151, at 38-82.
177 Colyer, 265 F. at 50. Anderson noted that few of those arrested appeared to be
radicals at all. For instance, the police in Lynn, Massachusetts, acting under the instruc-
tions of the Department of Justice, raided a hall where thirty-nine people, half of them
citizens, were holding a meeting to discuss the formation of a cooperative bakery. The
police arrested all thirty-nine, held them overnight in cells at the police station, and had
them docketed as "suspects," though thirty-eight of the thirty-nine people were later dis-
charged. Id. at 43-44.
178 Hoyt, supra note 20, at 90-91. One historian notes that although the Union of
Russian Workers did have a radical anarchist platform, the organization's "people's
houses," "[m]ore than revolutionary centers .... were social gathering places for Russian
immigrant male laborers excluded from American life by barriers of language, culture,
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. School of Law
HeinOnline  -- 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1463 2003
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Judge Anderson further condemned the Justice Department's
tactics, in particular the changed rule with regard to counsel. 179
According to Judge Anderson, the new rule granting counsel to the
potential deportees only after the government had made its case put
frightened, non-English-speaking aliens at a serious disadvantage.
In cases of doubt, aliens, already frightened by the terroristic
methods of their arrest and detention, were, in the absence of
counsel, easily led into some kind of admission as to their ownership
or knowledge of communistic or so-called seditious literature. The
picture of a non-English-speaking Russian peasant arrested under
circumstances such as described above, held for days in jail, then for
weeks in the city prison at Deer Island, and then summoned for a
so-called "trial" before an inspector, assisted by the Department of
Justice agent under stringent instructions emanating from the
Department of Justice in Washington to make every possible effort
to obtain evidence of the alien's membership in one of the pro-
scribed parties, is not a picture of a sober, dispassionate, "due pro-
cess of law" attempt to ascertain and report the true facts. 180
Judge Anderson also condemned the squalid conditions in which
the arrestees were kept and the Justice Department's apparent disre-
gard for their safety and well-being. 81 Summing up what he saw in
Boston, Judge Anderson wrote:
prejudice, and indifference and cut off from family and friends in Russia by war and
revolution." McCormick, supra note 22, at 146. This is borne out by a study of those
actually arrested by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America presented to
the Senate Judiciary Committee. See generally Constantine M. Panunzio, The Deportation
Cases of 1919-1920, reprinted in Palmer Statement II, supra note 151, at 308. Aliens told
Constantine M. Panunzio, author of the report, that they believed that the Union of
Russian Workers "is an organization for teaching culture and education," and "[a] union
for the purpose of teaching illiterate people by blackboards," and that "they are helping
the laborers, those who are in need and out of work; they are helping each other." Id. at
68, reprinted in Palmer Statement 1I, supra note 151, at 331.
179 See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
180 Colyer, 265 F. at 47.
181 In particular, Anderson noted the plight of one woman arrested with her eldest
daughter. At about midnight, the police sent the daughter home alone to a remote part of
the city. The woman was taken the next day to the wharf where she was confined in a dirty
toilet room. Afterward she spent thirty-three days at Deer Island. Id. at 43-44. Of the
prison, he wrote:
At Deer Island the conditions were unfit and chaotic. No adequate prepara-
tions had been made to receive and care for so large a number of people.
Some of the steam pipes were burst or disconnected. The place was cold; the
weather was severe. The cells were not properly equipped with sanitary
appliances....
In the early days at Deer Island one alien committed suicide by throwing him-
self from the fifth floor and dashing his brains out in the corridor below in the
presence of other horrified aliens. One was committed as insane; others were
driven nearly, if not quite, to the verge of insanity.
Id. at 45.
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I refrain from any extended comment on the lawlessness of these
proceedings by our supposedly law-enforcing officials. The docu-
ments and acts speak for themselves. It may, however, fitly be
observed that a mob is a mob, whether made up of government offi-
cials acting under instructions from the Department of Justice, or of
criminals, loafers, and the vicious classes.182
As the condemnations continued to roll in, former Senator
Albert J. Beveridge told a meeting of the American Bar Association
that "[t~he manner in which the official machinery was set in motion
to effect these arrests, seizures, and searches reveals a startling and
serious defect in our laws."' 183 He worried:
Under the statutory provision that any alien must be deported who
belongs to an organization that advocates or believes in the violent
overthrow of our Government the decision as to whether an organi-
zation is of the kind described in the statute can only be made by a
single administrative official of the National Government. Thus the
power of determining the meaning of party platforms and pro-
scribing, in mass, great numbers of individuals because of mere
nominal membership in those parties is exercised exclusively and
definitely by the Secretary of Labor. No court in the land has, in
practical effect, a small fraction of the judicial authority which is
thus exercised by this administrative official.1 84
4. Lasting Impact
By the middle of 1920, the paranoia of the Red Scare was on the
wane, and a serious critique of the civil rights violations of the Palmer
Raids began to emerge.1 85 Nonetheless, the general fear of
Bolshevism and radicalism, and the American people's association of
them with Southeastern and Eastern European immigrants, did not
disappear. 186 Out of the wartime anti-German spy-hunting and the
postwar, anti-Bolshevik Red-hunting came a sense that the "trouble
must come . . . from the tenacity and secret cunning of alien influ-
ences, together with a lack of sufficient solidarity on the part of true
182 Id. at 43.
183 Palmer Statement II, supra note 151, at 86 (statement of Sen. Walsh) (quoting Albert
J. Beveridge, The Assault upon the American Fundamentals, Address Before the
American Bar Association (Aug. 1920), in Report of the Forty-Third Annual Meeting of
the American Bar Association (1920)).
184 Id. at 86-87.
185 See supra notes 161-84 and accompanying text.
186 See, e.g., Robert A. Divine, American Immigration Policy, 1924-1952, at 8 (1972)
(discussing lingering fear of foreign radicals in country); John Higham, Strangers in the
Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925, at 265-66 (1994) (documenting revival of
nativist, racist, and anti-radical traditions in 1920s).
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Americans in resisting them."' 87 Together with the labor unrest of
1919, a brief depression in 1920, and a resurgence in immigration fol-
lowing the end of the war, these trends convinced many Americans
that they were in the process of being flooded with inassimilable
Eastern European immigrants who came to the United States not to
become Americans, but to take advantage of American prosperity
and to spread the chaos of Europe to American shores. 188 The Ku
Klux Klan, 189 the eugenics movement, 190 and anti-Semitism 19' all grew
in strength over the course of the 1920s. Bowing to this nativist pres-
sure, Congress passed a new immigration law in 1924 designed to stem
the "alien flood," "barbarian horde," and "foreign tide" 192 by
decreasing the number of Eastern and Southeastern Europeans who
would be allowed into the country. 193 Eventually these quotas would
make escape impossible for European Jews living under Hitler's
increasingly oppressive and eventually murderous control.
B. History Matters
So what? As the Richmond Newspapers test is currently applied,
the story of the Palmer Raids is an irrelevant tangent. The history of
the Palmer Raids provides little insight into whether deportation hear-
ings have been historically open to the public; it provides no answers
to Richmond Newspapers's historical inquiry. Nonetheless, this his-
tory must give us pause. Can a test so deeply concerned with history
completely disregard this past attempt to balance immigrant rights
and national security? Can a test so deeply concerned with history
disregard the lessons of our past?
1. Criticizing the Current History Test
Both the Third and Sixth Circuits, in line with the case law, asked
the question: Is there a history of open proceedings? Both circuits
struggled with the paucity of historical evidence surrounding deporta-
187 Higham, supra note 186, at 270.
188 Divine, supra note 186, at 6-8 (noting fear of "alien flood" and "alien indigestion").
As one letter-writer told the New Republic, "The old Americans are getting a little pan-
icky, and no wonder. ... America, Americans and Americanism are being crowded out of
America." He continued, "It is inevitable that there should be silly forms of protest and
rebellion. But the Ku Klux Klan and the hundred percenters are fundamentally right from
the standpoint of an American unity and destiny." Higham, supra note 186, at 264
(quoting Raymond G. Fuller, Letter to the Editor, Immigration and Americanism, 39 New
Republic 48, 48 (1924)).
189 Higham, supra note 186, at 290-91.
190 Divine, supra note 186, at 10-15.
191 See Higham, supra note 186, at 279.
192 Divine, supra note 186, at 6.
193 Id. at 17.
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tion hearings. But the history of the Palmer Raids raises the question
of whether the rigid test applied by the courts is reconcilable with
either reason or the Supreme Court's original logic in Richmond
Newspapers.
The rigidity of the history prong as it is currently applied raises a
number of concerns. First, the history analyzed rarely presents the
long, unbroken, consistent history presented in Richmond
Newspapers.194 What should a court do when, as with deportation
hearings, the history is ambivalent or uncertain? Some courts have
followed the lead of the Supreme Court' 95 by papering over inconsis-
tent evidence and presenting the legal fiction of a history (usually one
of openness). 196 Other courts essentially have abandoned the history
prong, relying almost entirely on the logic prong.197 Still others have
taken the view presented by the Sixth Circuit in Detroit Free Press
that in cases where the historical record is lacking, "it makes more
sense to look to more recent practice, similar proceedings, and con-
centrate on the 'logic' portion of the test.' '1 98 Thus a strong logical
argument for openness can make up for deficiencies in the historical
record.
194 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (Burger, C.J.,
plurality opinion) (stating that historical record shows "presumption of openness" in crim-
inal trials).
195 Judge Kimba M. Wood has sharply criticized the Court's opinion in Press-Enterprise
II. See Kimba M. Wood, The 1995 Justice Lester W. Roth Lecture: Reexamining the
Access Doctrine, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1105, 1116 (1996). Although the Court proclaimed that
the near-uniform practice of state and federal courts had been to conduct preliminary
hearings, Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986), it is obvious from Justice Stevens's
dissent that the Court was actually presented with a great deal of evidence tending to show
that preliminary hearings had often been closed, id. at 15-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196 Although some courts have simply given up on the history prong when faced with
these situations, many courts have instead come up with awkward analogies between tradi-
tional proceedings and contemporary proceedings. As Judge Wood notes, "Courts act as if
they must find a historical process to learn from in order to apply the history prong, even
when there was no comparable process at common law." Wood, supra note 195, at 1115
(referring to United States v. Hailer, 837 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1988) and Press-Enterprise 11 as
examples of overstretched history). Wood further posits that history often appears equiv-
ocal such that "courts tend either to rely more heavily on analogies to proceedings the
history of which is clear, or to find in history whatever is needed to justify the result." Id.
at 1115-16.
197 Today, however, the so-called history prong of the test has essentially been aban-
doned by the access doctrine. The right of access, as developed and expanded in recent
case law, relies almost exclusively on the "functional utility" prong of the original test.
Historical practice no longer operates to establish or corroborate a putative entitlement to
access to judicial information. Cerruti, supra note 35, at 308-09 (arguing for new access
doctrine that refines logic test but abandons history); see also United States v. Simone, 14
F.3d 833, 842 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding First Amendment right of access despite no history of
such).
198 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 703 n.14 (6th Cir. 2002).
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Both possibilities diminish the importance of the history test; the
first diminishing it to the point of a practical nullity. 199 Papering over
inconsistent history, in particular, also threatens to distort the lessons
of our past and enshrine understandings of our history that simply
may be wrong.
Another concern arising out of a rigid reading of the Richmond
Newspapers history test is that it simply does not make sense. Aside
from some possible reliance concern, it is not clear why the mere pres-
ence of a history of openness should establish a First Amendment
right of access.200 Even less clear is how a right of access can be
denied merely because that right has never been recognized. The
example of the Palmer Raids demonstrates this problem perfectly.
Under the current understanding of the history prong, the Palmer
Raids would only be relevant insofar as they might demonstrate that
deportation hearings have at times been closed, or at the very least,
that during times of national crisis the government has taken liberties
with immigrant rights and immigration procedure. Leaving aside the
still very open question of whether there is any evidence of closure
during the Palmer Raids,201 it simply seems nonsensical to find that
the deeply and roundly criticized history of civil rights abuse during
the Palmer Raids should serve as proof that the public has no right of
access to deportation hearings. To the extent that the history test
focuses on historical facts rather than historical lessons, it makes a
mockery of the use and study of history.
199 Many commentators have argued for the elimination of the history test. See, e.g.,
Cerruti, supra note 35, at 319 (suggesting new test that "reduces itself to a single question:
Is the information in question relevant to the court's official exercise of judicial
authority?"); Wood, supra note 195, at 1120 ("1 believe that our courts need to refocus the
analysis away from history."). This is certainly preferable to an irrational application of
history, but to the extent that it eliminates an important limit on the scope of the First
Amendment right of access, it must be rejected. A better, fuller understanding of history
can perform this limiting function and at the same time inform our understanding of the
logic prong. See discussion infra notes 217-28 and accompanying text.
200 See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 216 (3d Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 4082, at *1 (May 27, 2003) (expressing concern that this would
lead Congress to enact new administrative legislation with presumptions of closure lest
they inadvertently create right of access); see also Wood, supra note 195, at 1116 (criti-
cizing Press-Enterprise It interpretation that there was constitutional right to attend prob-
able cause hearing in Aaron Burr treason trial because many people did in fact attend).
201 As described supra notes 69 and 97 and accompanying text, the only evidence
presented by the government that hearings were closed during this period is a single pas-
sage in a single book noting that deportation hearings could be held in "a county jail,
hospital, prison or at his own home." Clark, supra note 19, at 363. A similarly ambiguous
piece of evidence can be found in Palmer Statement II, supra note 151, at 785 (citing John
Lord O'Brian's reference to "private hearing" in The Menace of Administrative Law, Pro-
ceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the Maryland State Bar Association
(1920)).
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History is not a parlor game. Constitutional rights should not be
decided by a game of Trivial Pursuit. History is not merely an anti-
quarian collection of facts-here, instances of closed or open deporta-
tion hearings-but rather a process of interpretation and
reinterpretation. 202 As E.H. Carr wrote, "The belief in a hard core of
historical facts existing objectively and independently of... the histo-
rian is a preposterous fallacy, but one which it is very hard to eradi-
cate. ' 20 3 History, like law, is a conversation with the past. 204 It is a
dialectic between ourselves and those who have thought and acted
before us. To inform our present choices, we often seek the advice of
our parents, grandparents, teachers, and mentors. We seek answers in
their experiences. History and law give us a framework to ask for
advice from those long past, to expand our group of advisors beyond
time and place. 20 5 History is "the means by which a culture sees
beyond the limits of its own senses. °20 6
History is a process of learning, not a database to be mined.207
Understanding the lessons of the past requires care, humility, and
engagement. It is a method for applying the experience of our fore-
bears, no less delicate than that of the law itself.
2. Rereading Richmond Newspapers
This understanding of the meaning and role of history is not nec-
essarily at odds with the Court's original understanding of the history
test. There is no doubt that the Justices writing in Richmond
Newspapers were deeply concerned with history; their concurring
202 See, e.g., E.H. Carr, What Is History? 20 (1961) ("Of course, facts and documents
are essential to the historian. But do not make a fetish of them. They do not by them-
selves constitute history; they provide .. no ready-made answer to this tiresome question:
What is history?").
203 Id. at 10.
204 See, e.g., id. at 35 ("[History] is a continuous process of interaction between the
historian and his facts, an unending dialogue between the present and the past."); id. at 164
("When, therefore, I spoke of history... as a dialogue between past and present, I should
rather have called it a dialogue between the events of the past and progressively emerging
future ends.").
205 See, e.g., John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the
Past 149 (2002) ("It's the basis, across time, space, and scale, for a wider view. A collective
historical consciousness, therefore, may be as much a prerequisite for a healthy well-
rounded society as is the proper ecological balance for a healthy forest and a healthy
planet.").
206 Id.
207 See, e.g., Carr, supra note 202, at 5 ("When we attempt to answer the question, What
is history?, our answer, consciously or unconsciously, reflects our own position in time, and
forms part of our answer to the broader question, what view we take of the society in
which we live."); Gaddis, supra note 205, at 22 ("In the historian's method of time travel,
though, you impose significances on the past, not the other way around.").
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opinions are steeped in it. Chief Justice Burger wrote that "[tjhe ori-
gins of the proceeding which has become the modern criminal trial in
Anglo-American justice can be traced back beyond reliable historical
records." 208 Justice Brennan wrote that "[t]o resolve the case before
us, therefore, we must consult historical and current practice with
respect to open trials, and weigh the importance of public access to
the trial process itself." 20 9 And Justice Blackmun wrote that "[i]t is
gratifying, first, to see the Court now looking to and relying upon legal
history in determining the fundamental public character of the crim-
inal trial. ' 210 They cite English history before and after the Norman
Conquest and American history from colonial times to the present.
The opinions record an unending list of observations from the six-
teenth-, seventeenth-, eighteenth-, nineteenth-, and twentieth-centu-
ries. Chief Justice Burger's opinion concludes: "From this unbroken,
uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in cen-
turies past, we are bound to conclude that a presumption of openness
inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of jus-
tice."' 21' Why were these Justices so concerned with history? Can a
mere history of openness create a public right of access?
There are two ways to understand the relevance of history
presented in the concurring opinions. The first, hinted at by Chief
Justice Burger's opinion, relies on the intent of the Constitution's
authors. The fact that criminal proceedings are presumptively open to
the public today is because they were presumptively open at the
founding of the Republic; the authors of the First Amendment
assumed the existence of such a right.212 This understanding has been
rejected by the Court. In a subsequent case, Press-Enterprise H, the
Court found that the experience prong did not require a pre-Bill of
Rights history of openness in order to be satisfied. 213 The second pos-
sible understanding is that of Justice Brennan, eventually accepted by
208 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564 (1980) (Burger, C.J., plu-
rality opinion).
209 Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
210 Id. at 601 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
211 Id. at 573 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion). Chief Justice Burger also quoted Justice
Black's opinion in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948), in which Justice Black recorded
the Court's inability to find a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera "in any
federal, state, or municipal court during the history of this country. Nor have we found any
record of even one such secret criminal trial in England since abolition of the . . . Star
Chamber .. " Id. at 266 n.9.
212 As Chief Justice Burger wrote, "The Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop
of the long history of trials being presumptively open." Id. at 575.
213 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1986) (finding history of openness in pre-
liminary hearings based solely on post-Bill of Rights history).
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the Court in Globe Newspaper.21 4 Justice Brennan founded his right
of access in a functional, or structural, understanding of the First
Amendment. 21 5 As interpreted by Brennan, the various protections
of the First Amendment assume an active and informed citizenry that
can participate and challenge its government.2 1 6
Justice Brennan recognized that the scope of such an argument is
endless since "[t]here are few restrictions on action which could not be
clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow.12 1 7
Access to government proceedings must be balanced against com-
peting concerns for secrecy. Justice Brennan sketched two guiding
principles: First, the case for a right of access has special force when
drawn from an enduring and vital tradition of public entree to partic-
ular proceedings or information. 218 More importantly, a tradition of
accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience.2 19
History is important because it carries the wisdom of experience.
"Second," wrote Justice Brennan, "the value of access must be mea-
sured in specifics. Analysis is not advanced by rhetorical statements
that all information bears upon public issues. ' 220 Thus, for Justice
Brennan, historical practice is not important in and of itself. Rather, a
history of open proceedings is probative evidence that openness
serves a positive role in the functioning of the proceeding; it gives the
argument for access "special force."' 22 1 The history prong thus but-
tresses the logic prong, demonstrating that the apparent logic of public
access has passed the test of time-that our reason is uncontradicted
by the wisdom of the ages. Thus, although the formulation of the his-
tory prong has always preceded the formulation of the logic prong in
the text of cases, the relationship between the two prongs must be
reversed. The relevant inquiry for Justice Brennan-and after Globe
Newspaper, for the Court-is whether openness plays an important
214 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604-06 (1982) (Brennan,
J.) ("[T]o the extent that the First Amendment embraces a right of access to criminal trials,
it is to ensure that this constitutionally protected 'discussion of governmental affairs' is an
informed one .... In sum, the institutional value of the open criminal trial is recognized in
both logic and experience.").
215 It is not clear that Chief Justice Burger would necessarily reject Justice Brennan's
analysis, even though it does not make up the core of his reasoning in the plurality opinion.
See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion) ("We hold that
the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment;
without the freedom to attend such trials... important aspects of freedom of speech and of
the press could be eviscerated.") (citations and quotations omitted).
216 Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (citations and quotations omitted).
217 Id. at 588 (citation and quotations omitted).
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role in the particular type of proceedings in question. An appeal to
history is made to see if this judgment matches the lessons of
experience.
Understood this way, there is no reason that the test must be for-
mulated as asking: Is there a history of openness? In Richmond
Newspapers, this formulation explained the relevance of the evidence
there present-a long, unbroken history of openness since the
Norman Conquest. 222 In that case, the tradition of openness demon-
strated that the logic of open criminal trials had stood the test of time.
But the existence of different cases with different types of evidence
may require that the test be formulated differently. Where secrecy in
the past has led to government abuse, a history of closure may dictate
a right to openness. The relevant question should be: What can the
history of these proceedings tell us about the need for openness?22 3
3. The Lessons of the Palmer Raids and Open Deportation
Hearings
Judge Kimba M. Wood notes "that events recorded in history
may be recorded not because they are typical, but, in some cases,
because they are atypical, or sensational.' '224 The history of deporta-
tion hearings and immigration policy is a history of the atypical. It is a
history written largely in times of crisis and fear, not in times of
peaceful contemplation. The lessons we can draw from our experi-
ence will not be found in the actions we have taken in times of crisis,
but rather in our judgments of those actions in times of peace. Thus,
the lesson of Korematsu v. United States, 225 which notoriously upheld
the World War II internment of Japanese Americans and is technically
still good law, is not that such actions are acceptable. Rather, that
decision is seen as a black stain on our country's legal history.226
222 For a broad discussion of Richmond Newspapers, see supra Part I.A. For a more
detailed account of the long historical record before the court in that case, see supra notes
208-12 and accompanying text.
223 This assessment is in line with that of Judge Wood, who argues for eradication of the
history prong because she thinks history divorced from context leads to perverse results in
right-of-access cases. Wood, supra note 195, at 1109 ("[T]he Court has given insufficient
weight to the dramatic changes in the criminal judicial process since the drafting of the
First Amendment-changes that make historical experience, divorced from its context,
misleading rather than enlightening."). Judge Wood also fears that the Court's "heavy
emphasis on history encourages a reliance on analogy at the expense of principled rea-
soning." Id.
224 Id. at 1116.
225 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
226 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 631-32 n.4
(14th ed. 2001) ("Korematsu is a case that has come to live in infamy."); Jerry Kang,
Thinking Through Internment: 12/7 and 9/11, 9 Asian L.J. 195, 196 (2002) ("For that, all
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Thus it is the negative lessons of the Palmer Raids that must
impact the decision whether deportation hearings should be constitu-
tionally open to the public. The Palmer Raids provide a cautionary
tale of what can happen in times of national crisis. The history teaches
how quickly wartime hysteria can produce nativism and fear of others.
It teaches how easily the government, often with popular support, can
take away important liberties and rights in the name of national
security.227 Most of all, the Palmer Raids experience teaches that gov-
ernment actions against the society's most vulnerable and marginal-
ized members must be subjected to the highest scrutiny.
All these lessons demonstrate the strength and wisdom of open
proceedings. They buttress the courts' assessments under the logic
test that open deportation hearings will help protect against govern-
ment abuse, enhance the perception of fairness, insert accountability,
and provide a therapeutic safety valve for a deeply wounded society to
see that justice is being done.2 28 These lessons are evidence that the
public should have a right of access to deportation hearings and that
such hearings can only be closed when narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest.
CONCLUSION
Neither reinterpreting the history test nor learning the lessons of
the Palmer Raids can definitively determine the constitutionality of
branches of the U.S. government have apologized."). One could also look at the Espio-
nage and Sedition Acts, widely used to prosecute dissenters, radicals, and communists
during World War I and the Red Scare that followed. See supra note 132 and accompa-
nying text. Although convictions were upheld at the time, see generally Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v.
United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), those prosecutions and statutes have since
been held to violate the First Amendment, see, e.g., Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
449 (1969) ("The contrary teaching of Whitney v. California cannot be supported, and that
decision is therefore overruled."). Notably, it is Justice Holmes's and Justice Brandeis's
dissents in those early cases that are remembered and continue to carry weight. See, e.g.,
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372-73 (Brandeis, J., concurring in judgment) (suggesting that correct
measure for limiting speech is evidence of clear and imminent danger); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (same); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (same).
227 See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
228 See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 217 (3d Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 4082, at *1 (May 27, 2003) (recognizing that openness would
serve these values in deportation hearings); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681,
703-04 (6th Cir. 2002) (same). Although the Third Circuit disagreed that the logic prong
was satisfied, it agreed that all of these purposes were fulfilled by openness. See supra
notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
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the Justice Department's blanket closure of deportation hearings. 229
As Judge Anthony J. Scirica noted in North Jersey Media Group, "The
stakes are high. Cherished traditions of openness have come up
against the vital and compelling imperatives of national security," and
"the countervailing positions of the parties go to the heart of our insti-
tutions, our national values, and the republic itself. ' 230 Deciding the
constitutionality of the Creppy Directive and the blanket closure of
deportation hearings is a difficult and unenviable task. History alone
will not and should not dictate the decisions. But history can inform
them; it can help us to better understand the importance of the values
at stake and the dangers involved in restricting them.
The Palmer Raids provide us with a real, rather than hypothet-
ical, picture of what can happen when immigrants' rights are pushed
aside in favor of national security. Our history must be a considera-
tion as we make difficult decisions about our future. As noted histo-
rian John Lewis Gaddis writes: "If we can widen the range of our
experience beyond what we as individuals have encountered, if we can
draw upon the experiences of others who've had to confront compa-
rable situations in the past, then-although there are no guarantees-
our chances of acting wisely should increase proportionately. '231
229 A fuller understanding of our history seems to demonstrate that there is a constitu-
tional right of access to deportation hearings. See supra Part II.B. Nonetheless, the
Richmond Newspapers test still requires a judge to decide whether the government has
shown that the blanket closure ruling was narrowly tailored to the state's interest.
230 N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 220, 228 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
231 Gaddis, supra note 205, at 9.
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